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This dissertation studies the relationship between exchange rate regimes and fi-
nancing decisions of corporations in small open economies with access to international
capital markets.
The second chapter develops a model of the choice between local and foreign
currency debt by capital-constrained firms facing exchange rate risk and hedging
possibilities. The model shows that the currency composition of debt and the level
of hedging are both endogenously determined as optimal firms’ responses to a tradeoff
between the lower cost of borrowing in foreign debt and the higher risk involved due to
exchange rate uncertainty. Results of the model are broadly consistent with lending
and hedging behavior of the corporate sector in small open economies recently hit by
a currency crisis. In particular, the model is able to explain why, unlike predictions of
previous work in the literature of currency crisis, the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate regime in Brazil in early 1999 did not cause a major change in the currency
composition of debt of the corporate sector.
The third chapter is co-authored with Uday Rajan and Amiyatosh Purnanandam.
It studies the effect of hedging with foreign currency derivatives on Brazilian firms
in the period 1997 through 2004, a period that includes the Brazilian currency cri-
1
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sis of 1999. This chapter finds that, compared to non-user firms, derivative users
have valuations that are 7-10% higher. Hedging with currency derivatives has three
noticeable effects on firms: (i) it increases foreign debt capacity, so that there is a
substitution from domestic debt to foreign debt, which is cheaper (ii) it removes the
sensitivity of capital expenditures to Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT),
and (iii) it results in higher net income, for a given level of leverage and EBIT. It
is argued that access to foreign debt represents a primary friction over the sample
period, which makes hedging valuable. The result on capital expenditures supports
the Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) model.
The fourth chapter presents a case study to analyze hedging strategies imple-
mented in practice by companies in Brazil. Two large companies, both operating in
international markets and using financial hedging are chosen to illustrate how corpo-
rations deal with exchange rate risk. Consistent with corporate hedging theory, the
case study finds that hedging contributes to smooth companies’ earning and helps
to mitigate the depletion of shareholder’s equity. In turn, this contributes to re-
duce investor’s risk perception about the firm and increases its foreign debt capacity.
Findings are consistent with the model of optimal debt composition and hedging de-
veloped in the second chapter and with empirical evidence about the financial effects
of hedging in Brazil of the third chapter.
CHAPTER II
Exchange rates, Optimal Debt Composition and Hedging in
Small Open Economies
2.1 Introduction
Recent currency crises in East Asia and Latin America have been characterized by
the presence of currency mismatches between assets and liabilities and inadequate
hedging in the balance sheets of the corporate sector.1 This mismatch between
foreign currency liabilities and domestic currency denominated assets in firm balance
sheets has been argued to be the root cause of the large output collapses following
currency depreciations. 2 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, firms understand
fixed exchange rates to be a guarantee and fail to insure their foreign exposure. 3 A
direct implication of this line of reasoning is that once the exchange rate is allowed to
float, firms will recognize their exposure, and foreign currency loans will be viewed
as more costly so that firms reduce their foreign currency borrowing. Unlike this
prediction, firm level evidence from Brazil over the period 1996 to 2001, suggests
that the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in Brazil, in early 1999, did not
1A currency mismatch occurs when a large fraction of firms’ debt is denominated in foreign currency while income
and assets are denominated in domestic currency.
2To see more on the balance sheet explanation of currency crises see for example Krugman (1999), Aghion,
Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) and Schneider and Tornell (2000).
3This implication is also consistent with another strand in the literature that emphasizes a moral hazard problem
introduced by implicit bailout guarantees provided by government, or free exchange rate risk management also
provided by government when fixing the exchange rate. These guarantees bias the composition of debt toward
foreign currency debt and eliminate incentives to hedge risk. See for example Burnside et al (2001).
3
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cause a major change in the currency composition of debt of the corporate sector.
This paper attempts to offer an explanation to this apparently surprising result.
To study this phenomenon the chapter develops a theoretical framework that
examines the firm’s choice of local and foreign currency debt in the presence of
exchange rate risk and hedging possibilities. The model shows that the currency
composition of debt and the optimal level of hedging are joint decisions and depend
on common factors such as exchange rate risk and financial default, interest rates,
the size of net worth and costs of foreign currency risk management. The key element
driving the model results is the tradeoff that firms face between the lower cost of
borrowing in foreign currency and the higher risk involved due to exchange rate
uncertainty. When affordable, hedging reduces firms’ exposure to currency risk and
expands their debt capacity in foreign currency. Thus, even after a large currency
depreciation, say after the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime, hedged firms are
able to maintain and even increase their access to foreign currency borrowing.
In the model, firms are forward-looking agents and make their borrowing decisions
based on expectations of currency depreciation. Thus, even if they observe a fixed
exchange rate, as long as they perceive that the regime is not credible or is no longer
sustainable, they will anticipate a future depreciation and will start taking care of
the devaluation risk by engaging in hedging activities. This seems to be the case
of some firms in Brazil, which were hedged using currency derivatives even during
the period of the fixed exchange rate. Furthermore, when financial markets provide
enough tools to mitigate the effects of the devaluation risk (e.g. currency forward
contracts), the collapse of the fixed exchange rate may cause only small changes in
the currency composition of debt because with the opportunity to hedge companies
may not reduce foreign currency debt after the devaluation.
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The model predictions are broadly consistent with lending and hedging behavior
of the corporate sector in small open economies that recently faced a currency crisis.
The theory suggests that, when the economy moves from fixed to floating exchange
rates, some firms change financing policies and the population of firms exposed to
foreign exchange risk is altered. Firms with insufficient net worth and those unable
to afford buying a hedge lose access to capital markets. Firms with high enough net
worth and those able to hedge increase their foreign debt. Firms with intermediate
net worth but unable to hedge borrow less in foreign currency, turn to domestic banks
and are monitored in order to maintain their access to foreign capital markets. With
a macroeconomic environment characterized by a moderate probability of currency
depreciation and inexpensive hedging, these changes in the population of firms can
offset each other so that the average currency composition of debt does not vary
significantly across regimes.
The chapter builds on the model developed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
adapted to the context of a small open economy. The paper with the analytical
framework most closely related to the one presented in this chapter is Martinez and
Werner (2002). They also extend the Holmstrom and Tirole model to the small
open economy case and find that before the Mexican crisis in 1994, the decision of
borrowing in pesos or dollars depended on the exchange rate regime to the extent
that an implicit guarantee was provided by the government by fixing the exchange
rate. However, these authors treat the exchange rate as a deterministic variable so
that no hedging strategies are discussed. Arguably, their model captures only part
of the story; there is no discussion of how the interaction between domestic and
dollar debt changes and how the population of firms is altered when the economy
moves to a floating regime and firms are able to hedge. In their model, as in most
6
of the previous literature, it is implicit that large amounts of foreign currency debt
represent a high degree of exposure to exchange rate risk.
As mentioned above, prior theoretical models suggest a negative impact of a large
devaluation on companies’ foreign currency borrowing and a reduction in currency
mismatches. However, empirical findings on the relationship between exchange rate
regimes and currency mismatches in the balance sheet of corporations are mixed and
still subject to debate. Some studies find that the adoption of a floating exchange
rate regime reduces currency mismatches by reducing the foreign currency borrowing
and increasing the levels of hedging while others find that firms borrow even more
after the currency crisis.4 The model in this chapter helps explain these apparently
contradicting results between theory and empirical evidence by providing an analyt-
ical framework in which currency mismatches are reduced after the currency crisis
without having firms borrowing less in foreign debt. Hedging operations allow corpo-
rations, on aggregate, to maintain their access to international capital markets and
have their currency composition of credit almost unchanged.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
main empirical facts and the motivation for the analysis using firm-level data from
Brazil. Section 2.3 describes the model of optimal debt allocation and hedging at the
firm level. Section 2.4 offers the main results of the model under fixed and floating
exchange rates. Section 2.5 concludes.
4Empirical support of currency mismatches and exchange rate exposure during fixed exchange rate regimes is
found by Burnside et al (2001) in the Asian crisis, Dominguez and Tesar (2001) in 8 non-industrialized and emerging
markets and Bonomo et al (2003) using financial data from Brazilian firms. On a different study also using Brazilian
firms Rossi (2004) finds that the adoption of the floating regime reduced the foreign vulnerability of the corporate
sector by having a negative impact on firms’ foreign borrowing and a positive impact on hedging. However, Martinez
and Werner (2002) find that firms in Mexico were able to increase their dollar debt borrowing after the crisis in
1995 and Arteta (2002) in a cross-country study finds no evidence that a floating exchange rate regime reduces bank
currency mismatches. Similarly, Allayannis et al (2002) find that non-financial firms in Asian countries were able to
maintain substantial levels of foreign currency debt even after the currency crisis. It is important to say however,
that except for only few studies such as Rossi (2004) and Allayannis et al (2002), most studies in the empirical
literature only used data on the currency composition of debt at the firm and bank level since data on hedging are
often not available or hard to collect.
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2.2 Empirical evidence on foreign currency exposure and hedging: Brazil
1996-2001
In this section firm-level data on Brazilian firms are examined before and after
the currency crisis in 1999. Like other Latin American countries, Brazil suffered
from unexpected reversals in capital flows after subsequent crises in Mexico (1994),
East Asia (1997) and Russia (1998). The macroeconomic adjustment forced by
substantial capital outflows at the end of 1998 brought large and persistent swings
in the exchange rate that finally led to the collapse of the crawling peg and a sharp
devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999.
Firm-level data correspond to financial information for almost 200 companies pub-
licly traded in the São Paulo Stock Exchange Market (BOVESPA) over the period
1996 to 2001.5 This information was taken directly from companies’ annual financial
reports. Data contain information on balance sheet variables such as the book value
of assets, the currency composition of debt and shareholder’s equity. Data on hedging
transactions were hand-collected and consist of the year-end notional value of cur-
rency derivatives (forwards, futures, swaps and options) obtained from the footnotes
to financial statements available at BOVESPA. Financial and state-owned firms are
excluded because of their different motivation for using currency derivatives.
Table 2.1 illustrates the currency composition of debt and hedging activities of
firms across exchange rate regimes. As seen from the table, there is not a major
change in the currency composition of debt, measured by the ratio of dollar debt
to total debt, when the Brazilian economy moved from the fixed to the floating
exchange rate regime.6 Over the sample, this ratio remains stable around 44%. On
5This period is chosen because it provides valuable information to a comparative analysis on firm’s behavior
regarding financing and risk management policies before and after the currency crisis in 1999, and also because
disclosure of information on derivatives was mandatory only after 1995.
6The lack of major changes in the currency composition of debt remains even after correcting for the valuation
effect of the currency depreciation in the ratio of foreign to total debt.
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average, the dollar debt ratio slightly increased from 42% during the fixed exchange
rate period to 45% during the floating period. Across different groups of firms the
dollar debt ratio seems to exhibit a similar pattern, except for small firms that
on average slightly decrease their dollar debt ratio. On the other hand, hedging
operations, approximated by the fraction of the notional value of currency derivatives
to dollar debt, increased from 1% in 1996 to 28% in 2001. Interestingly, data show
that hedging operations increased during the floating exchange rate regime but were
already observed during the fixed exchange rate period, especially for medium and
large corporations. Large companies increased their hedging ratio on average from
6 to 26%. This latter observation indicates that even before the currency crisis, and
most likely after crisis episodes in East Asia and Russia, some firms indebted in
foreign currency were taking care of the devaluation risk by hedging their positions
using currency derivatives. As will be seen later, this behavior is consistent with the
model predictions highlighting the hedging side of financing policies in small open
economies subject to currency risk. While highly suggestive, this table also seems to
show some evidence of costly hedging since the increase in the hedging ratio mostly
occurred in large and medium size companies while small firms appear to hedge a
small fraction of their dollar debt even during the floating regime.
An interesting feature regarding the hedging behavior of the corporate sector
in Brazil is that most financial hedging transactions correspond to currency swap
contracts. Unlike evidence for U.S. large non-financial corporations, which report
currency forwards and options as the most commonly used tool to manage exchange
rate exposure, firms in Brazil seem to prefer currency swaps, effectively converting
foreign debt into domestic debt through simultaneous transactions in the spot and the
forward markets. Broad preference for currency swaps is also consistent with costly
9
hedging, since a swap reduces transaction costs by allowing companies to arrange
in only one contract what may take several transactions (e.g. forward contracts) to
replicate.7
Table 2.2 shows the number of firms holding financial debt in domestic and foreign
currency and those using currency derivatives. These data also provide evidence of
minor changes in the corporate sector’s borrowing behavior. The number of firms
borrowing in both currencies and the number of firms borrowing only in domestic
currency both slightly increased during the floating regime. The number of firms
increases during the sample period from 110 in 1996 to 185 in 2001. The number
of firms that hedge using currency derivatives increases after the collapse of the
exchange rate regime from 7 in 1997 to 62 in 2001. Interestingly, about 56% of the
firms with dollar debt in the sample still remain unhedged during the floating regime.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section seems to support the view that
there are no significant changes in the borrowing patterns of the Brazilian corporate
sector during the period 1996 through 2001, that is, before and after the currency
crisis. It should be mentioned that having a genuine measure of firm-level hedging is
difficult, and the previous observations about hedging refer only to the use of currency
derivatives. Firms may use different hedging strategies other than derivatives, such
as holdings of dollar-denominated assets and revenues from exports, which are not
emphasized in the current analysis and are left to the fourth chapter. The main
point that can be emphasized however is that, contrary to prior suggestions, after
the large depreciation that followed the collapse of the fixed exchange rate firms in
Brazil were still able to borrow significantly in foreign currency, more companies
7Bonomo et al (2003) pointed out that Brazilian firms prefer currency swaps because they can obtain advantageous
swap contracts from local banks. Banks, in turn, are able to offer these contracts because they are not exposed to
exchange rate risk since they hold government bonds indexed to the dollar in their portfolios. According to these
authors, in the end the hedge appears to be provided by government through bank intermediation.
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hedged this debt by getting involved in currency derivative markets and there was
still a large fraction of firms holding dollar debt which was not financially hedged
through currency derivatives. As shown in the next section, predictions of the model
of optimal debt allocation and hedging are consistent with these empirical facts.
2.3 A Model of Optimal Currency Composition of Debt and Hedging
Consider a small open economy described by a two-date model (t = 0, 1). The
economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral firms, domestic banks and
foreign banks. Firms are run by wealth-constrained entrepreneurs who need to raise
funds to cover their investment outlays. Firms’ investment projects can be financed
by borrowing in either domestic currency from local banks or in foreign currency from
foreign banks. Given the uncertainty about the exchange rate, firms can choose
to hedge their foreign exchange risk by signing forward contracts offered by local
banks. At t=0 firms sign debt contracts and make investment, borrowing and hedging
decisions. At t=1, exchange rate and investment returns are realized and claims are
settled. Agents are protected by limited liability so that no party can end up with
negative payoffs.
2.3.1 Investment Projects
Each firm has access to a project requiring an investment of fixed size I > 0 at date
0, which yields at date 1 a verifiable return in domestic currency R in case of success
and nothing in case of failure. Firms differ only in their initial capital A (which
is publicly observable). The distribution of firms is described by the cumulative
distribution function F(A). It will be assumed that A < I, so that firms need external
funding to undertake their investments. There are three types of investment projects
as described in Figure 2.1: a good project with a high probability of success PG,
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and a bad project and a worse project, each with the same probability of success PB
(PG > PB). The bad project gives a low private benefit b and the worse project gives
a high benefit B to the entrepreneur, B > b > 0. Firms face a moral hazard problem
in choosing a project. In the absence of proper incentives or outside monitoring,
entrepreneurs can divert resources by deliberately reducing the probability of success
of a project (from PG to PB) to enjoy the private benefit.
Figure 2.1: Three Types of Investment Projects
Project Good Bad Worse
Probability
of success PG PB PB
Private Benefit 0 b B
Local banks can monitor firms to reduce the moral hazard problem and elimi-
nate the worse project (B-project). Monitoring is costly so that local banks face a
fixed cost C > 0. Foreign banks are uninformed investors (i.e. they are unable to
monitor firms) and have access to alternative projects with a gross rate of return r∗
in international markets. Furthermore, it is assumed that given the rate of return
on investor capital in domestic currency denoted by rf , only the good project has a
positive expected net present value (NPV), even if the private benefit of the firm is
included:
(2.1) PG R− rf I > 0 > PB R− rf I +B
2.3.2 Financing Decisions and Exchange Rate Risk
In what follows, firms are represented by the index f ; domestic banks are repre-
sented by the index m and foreign banks are represented by the index u. At date 0
a representative firm invests all its funds A 8 and signs debt contracts to borrow in
8It is also assumed that the internal rate of return of investment projets exceeds the market rate rf which means
that funds invested in the firm are worth the external rate of return plus an incentive effect.
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domestic currency an amount Im from local banks and in foreign currency an amount
Iu from foreign investors so that:
9
(2.2) A+ Im + sL Iu ≥ I
where sL > 0 is the exchange rate at date 0, quoted as sL units of domestic cur-
rency per unit of foreign currency. Notice that investment return and exchange rate
are both uncertain. This is a departure from the original credit model of Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). In addition to the moral hazard structure of their model, the cur-
rent setup extends the firm’s investment problem not only by considering the case of
firms borrowing in foreign currency from international capital markets but also by
adding a new dimension to the problem. In the setup here there is the possibility of
default due to exchange rate risk and the hedging activities used by firms to mitigate
that risk. Investment projects are now subject to two types of bad events: failure
(economic default) or bankruptcy due to currency-led default (financial default). Ex-
change rate fluctuations, therefore, can turn solvent firms into bankrupt firms even
when they undertake successful projects. It will be assumed that in the event of any
type of default, firms’ creditors are left with nothing.10
For simplicity, consider only two states of nature about the exchange rate: low
(L) and high (H). At date 0 the exchange rate is sL. If the economy operates under
a fixed exchange rate regime then at date 1 s1 = sL. Under a floating exchange rate
regime, at date 1 the exchange rate can either depreciate to sH > sL with probability
q, or remain unchanged with probability 1− q. To avoid losses due to exchange rate
fluctuations, companies may decide to hedge their foreign exchange risk by buying
9There is no other source of funding (e.g. equity finance) in the model. As is the case of emerging economies in
Asia and Latin America, a large part of the funds for investments are provided in the form of bank loans.
10For example, in case of financial default the firm is declared bankrupt and its residual value is completely used
to pay for bankruptcy costs.
13
currency forward contracts.
Let F be the one-period forward exchange rate charged to the firm and defined
as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. Given the possibility
of economic and financial default on the firm side, it will be assumed that forward




(1− q) sL + q sH if financially solvent in both states L,H
sL if financially solvent in state L
sH if financially solvent in state H
Note that sL ≤ F ≤ sH . Expression (2.3) states that the forward rate is adjusted
according to the risk of financial default in a way such that over-hedging (e.g. infinite
hedging in case of zero transaction costs) is ruled out as will be clear in the next
paragraphs. Another important feature of the hedging contract is that payments in
either direction are contingent on the project succeeding. In other words, when the
project fails and state sL occurs the firm has nothing so that it will not pay out on
the hedging contract, but it will not receive any payment either if state sH occurs and
the project fails. This particular feature guarantees that a hedged firm will always
be able to obtain a forward contract at the rate F = (1− q) sL + q sH , which occurs
because the hedging contract is offered by domestic banks so that payments in both
directions are netted out on average.12
Let h be the amount of forward contracts in foreign currency that the firm pur-
chases and φ the transaction costs per unit of forward contract. For simplicity, let
11As shown later, the forward rate is related to interest rates according to a covered interest parity condition.
12For simplicity, it is assumed that firms buy forward contracts from domestic banks other than those from which
they borrow so that transaction costs of hedging do not represent revenues to domestic lenders.
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φ be also expressed in domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. At date 1, if
the project succeeds, proceeds from hedging operations in domestic currency are:
(2.4) ΠH = h (s1 − F )− φ |h|
Note that firms in the model are forward-looking agents. They make their debt
and hedging decisions based on expectations of currency depreciation. Moreover,
the probability of depreciation q > 0 could also be interpreted as the probability of
devaluation during fixed exchange rates when the regime is not credible. Strictly
speaking, q > 0 would be the conditional probability that the exchange rate is
devalued at date 1 having been fixed at date 0.
A debt contract must specify the amount borrowed from each lender and the
payments to each of them under all circumstances so that:
1. If the project fails, it pays zero to all parties.
2. At date 1, if the project succeeds and the firm does not default, project returns
R plus proceeds from hedging operations (if any) are divided among parties,
from which the firm receives Rf (s1) ≥ 0, local banks receive Rm ≥ 0, foreign
banks receive s1Ru ≥ 0 and forward sellers receive φ|h| ≥ 0.
Note that debt payments to lenders are independent of the exchange rate at date 1,
s1, provided the firm is solvent. However, returns to the entrepreneur (the equity-
holder) depend on s1.
Financial default occurs at date 1 when the firm, even if undertaking a success-
ful investment, is unable to meet its financial obligations and becomes bankrupt.
Financial default is then given by the following condition:
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(2.5) R−Rf (s1)−Rm(s1)− s1Ru(s1) + h(s1 − F )− φ|h| < 0
As mentioned above, the forward rate in expression (2.3) rules out over-hedging.
For example, consider the case of a firm wanting to buy a significantly high amount
of forward contracts to increase its expected payment when sH occurs but default
when sL occurs. Since the firm is solvent only in state H, expression (2.5) becomes
positive in state H but negative in state L. By setting F = sH forward sellers eliminate
incentives for firms to over-hedge because in such a case the firm will not be paid in
the depreciation state.
The preceding analysis implies that the firm hedges its foreign exchange exposure
in order to reduce the possibility of financial default. Furthermore, a firm that is
hedged ex-ante cannot be insolvent or solvent in only one state. Since financial
default may occur in either state L or H, let 1L and 1H be indicator variables such
that:
1H =
 1 if solvent in state H0 if default in state H
(2.6) 1L =
 1 if solvent in state L0 if default in state L
Accordingly, expected cash flows to the entrepreneur with zero proceeds from
hedging, when the firm invests in the good project are:
Rf (sH) =
 PG [R−Rm − sH Ru] if solvent in state H0 if default in state H
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(2.7) Rf (sL) =
 PG [R−Rm − sL Ru] if solvent in state L0 if default in state L
2.3.3 Firm’s Expected Profits
At date 0, a firm with initial capital A and investment I chooses the currency
composition of its debt (Im and Iu), creditors’ payments (Rm and Ru), its hedging
amount (h) and its expected payments Rf (sL) and Rf (sH) to maximize expected
total profits:
(2.8)
E[ΠTOT ] = PG[(1−q)1L[R−Rm−sLRu]+q1H [R−Rm−sHRu]−φ|h|]+rf (I−A−Im−sLIu)
subject to resource constraints, incentive and participation constraints and non-
negativity constraints (e.g. limited liability).
In setting up the problem in this way, it is assumed that the firm undertakes only
good projects with probability of success PG. This will be always the case because
incentive constraints will be imposed. Recall that only good projects have NPV > 0
which means that if bad projects are undertaken no borrowing is obtained from
creditors.
Depending on the exchange rate realization, when the firm is financially solvent,
project returns R and proceeds from hedging operations are distributed among all
the parties according to the following resource constraints:
(2.9) Rf (sL) +Rm + sL Ru = R + h (sL − F )− φ|h|
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(2.10) Rf (sH) +Rm + sH Ru = R + h (sH − F )− φ|h|
When the firm defaults in either state H or L it pays nothing to parties and the
residual value of the firm covers bankruptcy costs.
Let 1m be an indicator variable such that 1m = 1 if the firm borrows from the local
bank (with monitoring) and 1m = 0 if the firm borrows directly from foreign banks
and not from local banks (without monitoring). Given the two states of nature of the
exchange rate, the firm invests in a good project whenever it obtains an expected
payment greater or equal than the expected payment of a bad project including
private benefits, in other words, when:
(2.11) PG [(1−q)Rf (sL)+qRf (sH)] ≥ PB[(1−q)Rf (sL)+qRf (sH)]+1mb+(1−1m)B
This is the firm’s incentive constraint and can be also written as:






where ∆p = PG − PB > 0.
2.3.4 Domestic Bank Lending
A local bank monitors the firm and finances the project whenever it receives
an expected payment sufficient to cover the fixed monitoring cost C. The bank’s
incentive constraint is then given by:




On the other hand, the bank is willing to finance the project if it receives at least
an expected payment net of monitoring costs equal to the opportunity cost of its
funds. The participation constraint for the bank is then given by:
(2.14) PG [1L (1− q) + 1H q] Rm − 1m C ≥ rf Im
Let r denote the domestic lending rate that the local bank charges on Im funds
lent to the firm, defined as:
(2.15) r =
PG [1L (1− q) + 1H q] Rm
Im
The minimum domestic rate of return r acceptable for the bank to lend in domestic




− C = rf PG C
r∆p
The previous expression is obtained by combining conditions (2.13) through (2.15),
all holding with equality, and assuming that the bank lends to the project so that
1m = 1. This condition, in turn, implies that
(2.17) r = rf
PG
PB
This expression for the domestic lending rate states that the cost of domestic
funds incorporates a risk premium relative to the risk-free rate. At the minimum
rate of return acceptable for a bank the risk premium is equal to the ratio of success
probabilities of the good and bad projects.
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Local banks can borrow and lend internationally and are able to replicate a for-
ward contract. Perfect competition and non-arbitrage conditions ensure that banks
are indifferent between lending in domestic currency at rf , converting these funds
into foreign currency at date 0 at the spot rate sL and lending abroad in foreign
currency earning r∗, and converting these funds back to domestic currency at the
forward rate F . These transactions imply that:
(2.18) rf = r∗
F
sL
This is a covered interest rate parity condition and can be also expressed in terms
of the domestic lending rate and the international rate as:13





In this expression PG > PB and F > sL so that the bank lending rate r is always
greater than the international interest rate r∗. Thus, foreign debt is always preferred
to domestic debt. The result that foreign debt is cheaper than domestic debt is due
to the moral hazard structure associated with investment projects. Intuitively, given
that local banks face a fixed cost to monitor firms, then the lending rate in domestic
loans incorporates not only the expected change in the exchange rate given by the
ratio F/sL but also a risk premium due to asymmetric information given by the ratio
PG/PB. As a result, when they have to, firms will minimize borrowing from a local
bank and obtain the rest of their funds from foreign lenders.
13Using covered interest rate parity and efficient markets hypothesis are certainly very strong and simplifying
assumptions. The incorporation of parameter φ as transaction costs in setting up a hedging program is an attempt
to add some friction and bring a more realistic feature of foreign exchange markets to the model. These transaction
costs in practice are expressed as a bid-ask spread in forward and spot rate quotations.
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The firm will be able to borrow in foreign currency if foreign banks are promised an
expected payment greater than or equal to what they could obtain by investing their
funds in international capital markets at the rate r∗. The foreign bank participation
constraint in foreign currency is then:
(2.20) PG [1L (1− q) + 1H q] Ru ≥ r∗ Iu
2.3.5 Firm’s Profit Maximization
The firm’s problem is to find variables h, Im, Iu, Rm, Ru, Rf (sL), Rf (sH) given
exogenous parameters such as the firm’s initial assets A, its fixed investment I, the
foreign rate of return r∗, the probability of currency depreciation q and the cost of
hedging φ, in order to:
Maximize E[ΠTOT ] =
PG(1− q)1L[R−Rm − sLRu] + q1H [R−Rm − sHRu]− φ|h|+ rf (I−A− Im−sLIu)
subject to
A+ Im + sL Iu ≥ I (1)
If firm is solvent:
Rf (sL) +Rm + sL Ru = R + h (sL − F )− φ|h| (2)
Rf (sH) +Rm + sH Ru = R + h (sH − F )− φ|h| (3)




[1L (1− q) + 1H q] Rm ≥ 1m C∆p (5)
PG [1L (1− q) + 1H q] Rm − 1m C ≥ rf Im (6)
PG [1L (1− q) + 1H q] Ru ≥ r∗ Iu (7)
Rf (sH) ≥ 0 (8)
Rf (sL) ≥ 0 (9)
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Conditions (1) through (3) are resource constraints. Conditions (4) and (5) are
the incentive constraints of the firm and the domestic bank. Conditions (6) and (7)
are the participation constraints for domestic and foreign banks. Conditions (8) and
(9) are non-negativity constraints for the firm’s payments. Only one of these two
non-negativity constraints will be binding when the firm defaults in one state of the
exchange rate but is solvent in the other. Notice that there are 9 constraints to solve
for 7 choice variables, which means that in equilibrium at least 7 constraints must
be binding.
2.3.6 Equilibrium
The determination of the equilibrium as well as closed-form solutions for the
currency composition of debt and optimal hedging are explained in detail in appendix
A.1. As an illustration, consider that both borrowing and hedging decisions are
endogenously determined as optimal firms’ responses to a tradeoff between the lower
cost of borrowing in foreign debt and the higher risk involved due to exchange rate
uncertainty. As explained above, foreign currency debt is preferred to domestic debt
so that the firm always tries to borrow directly from foreign banks. The smaller the
size of its initial assets A, the more the firm demands from international banks. Since
exchange rate uncertainty makes foreign debt risky, foreign banks demand a minimum
net worth and hedging operations through currency forwards to ensure that the firm
is solvent enough to repay its debt. If the firm’s initial net worth is not sufficient
to meet the foreign bank’s requirement then the firm must be monitored and will
borrow from domestic banks first, in order to be able to borrow from international
markets. Local banks help firms undertake investments projects because domestic
lending reduces the net worth requirement. Depending on the size of its net worth,
the monitored firm may also need to hedge to demonstrate financial solvency.
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Given that the internal rate of return is greater than the external rate on firm
capital, entrepreneurs prefer to invest all their funds in the project. Therefore,
constraint (1) in the firm’s problem will be binding in most cases. The only exception
occurs when a firm borrows only in domestic currency from local banks. Recall that
local banks have to cover the fixed monitoring costs so that they lend all firms the
same fixed amount in domestic currency. Therefore, when the firm has a net worth
insufficient to borrow only in foreign currency but high enough to borrow the fixed
amount in domestic currency, and the sources of funds exceed the size of investment,
then constraint (1) is not binding and the firm has to invest its excess funds at the
market rate rf .
Another key feature of the model is that hedging decisions are perfectly observed
by creditors. An immediate implication is that firms have incentives to hedge their
exchange rate risk to reduce the probability of financial default. When affordable
and useful, hedging increases profits by expanding the possibility of borrowing in
foreign currency at a lower cost. The equilibrium level of hedging corresponds to any
value within an optimal range defined by constraints (2), (3), (8) and (9) as shown
in the appendix. Depending on exogenous parameters, in particular q and φ, the
minimum level of hedging in this range can be positive or negative (negative hedging
implies that the firm sells forward contracts). As shown in what follows, intermediate
values of q and small enough φ make the minimum level of hedging positive so that
a profit maximizing firm will always choose this minimum level. However, there will
be situations when the firm optimally chooses not to hedge. To see this, let q be
the probability of depreciation that makes the minimum level of hedging equal to
zero and φ be the transaction cost in forward markets above which, for any given
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level of positive q, forward contracts are too costly to provide insurance.14 When the
probability of depreciation is too high, say q > q, describing for example a situation
of extreme exchange rate volatility, firms will find optimal to choose a zero level of
hedging. On the other hand, when hedging is too costly, say φ > φ, then even if
available hedging is not affordable so that firms will also choose not to hedge.
A representative firm solves its profit maximization problem under two situations:
when it hedges enough to avoid financial default and when it does not hedge at all.15
Given that hedging is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for financial solvency,
a firm with sufficiently high net worth can borrow only small amounts of foreign
currency debt and be financially solvent without hedging. Therefore, when the firm
does not hedge at all, there are two additional possibilities: the firm is solvent even
without hedging or the firm defaults if it is not hedged. Each of these situations
exists for a monitored company borrowing in both currencies and for a company
borrowing only in foreign currency. These multiple cases imply that creditors demand
different net worth levels depending on the composition of credit and the firm’s
hedging strategy.
Appendix A.2 illustrates the solution to all these net worth requirements. For the
purpose of analysis, a brief description of them is in order: lower bar net worth levels
denote minimum net worth requirements for firms being monitored and borrowing
from domestic banks first while upper bar net worth levels denote the net worth
requirements for firms borrowing directly from foreign banks. Accordingly, AH is
the minimum net worth for an optimally hedged firm that borrows in both domestic
and foreign currency. Similarly, AH is the minimum level of assets required for an






) and φ = sH − F = (1− q)(sH − sL) respectively.
15Partly hedging is ruled out because in case of currency depreciation, this level of hedging is not sufficient to
avoid default so that the firm is forced to default as if hedging was zero in the first place. With sufficiently small but
positive costs of hedging the firm will prefer zero hedging to partly hedging.
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optimally hedged firm wanting to borrow only in foreign currency from international
banks.
When the firm does not hedge and as a result is not solvent in state H then the
minimum net worth requirements are ANH and ANH for firms being monitored by
local banks and for firms borrowing directly from foreign banks respectively. If the
firm is unhedged but solvent in state H then it faces a higher minimum net worth
required by creditors: ASNH if monitored by local banks and ASNH if it demands
borrowing directly from foreign banks. 16 An unhedged but solvent firm faces the
highest net worth requirements. On the other hand, hedging, when affordable, allows
the firm to face the lowest net worth requirement. In equilibrium, depending on the
size of the firm’s initial assets and its hedging strategy, there are different financing
possibilities. To decide the optimal currency composition of its debt (e.g. how
much to borrow from each source) and whether it should be hedged or not, the firm
compares its initial assets A with these cutoff levels.
2.4 Hedging costs, Exchange rate risk and the Segmentation of firms in
Equilibrium
2.4.1 Equilibrium with costless hedging (φ = 0)
Costless hedging represents a long run equilibrium in which currency forward
markets are competitive and well-developed so that transaction costs are negligible.
The next two results illustrate the optimal financing policies when the economy
operates under a fixed exchange rate regime and under floating exchange rates as
two separate steady state equilibria.
16As explained in appendix A.2, a second and more stringent criterion for unhedged and solvent firms is also
considered. This is the case of firms that are solvent and expect to receive the maximum expected payment given
by constraint (4) even in the depreciation state. The minimum net worth requirment for these firms is even higher:
AS if they are monitored and AS if they want to borrow only from international markets.
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Lemma 1. In an economy with credible fixed exchange rates, that is when q=0, an
optimal strategy for a firm is not to hedge its dollar debt.
Proof : See Appendix B.1
This basic result explains why a fixed exchange rate biases the currency composi-
tion of debt for some firms towards foreign currency debt and eliminates incentives
to operate in forward markets. By fixing the exchange rate, the government provides
a form of public hedging or free risk management to the corporate sector by creating
a perception of no foreign exchange risk.17 Consequently, some firms that other-
wise would not be able to borrow at all, or some others that should be monitored
to have access to international capital markets, are now able to obtain foreign cur-
rency debt without constraints. This situation creates incentives for entrepreneurs
to borrow extensively in foreign currency without hedging and to maintain currency
mismatches in their balance sheets. As predicted by the balance sheet approach
of currency crises, in the event of unexpected and large currency depreciation the
corporate sector in this economy could face widespread bankruptcy.
Lemma 2. In an economy with floating exchange rates when 0 < q < q in equilibrium
the optimal strategy for a firm with net worth A such that AH < A < ASNH or
AH < A < ASNH is to hedge its dollar debt through currency forwards enough to
avoid bankruptcy.
Proof : See Appendix B.2
According to this result, during a floating regime or a non-credible fixed exchange
rate regime, as long as a positive probability of currency depreciation makes forward
17With costless hedging and q = 0 the cutoff thresholds of the net worth requirements are at their lowest value
and the firm is indifferent about how much it hedges since F = sL.
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contracts a useful instrument to deal with exchange rate risk, the firm immediately
hedges to reduce the possibility of financial default and obtain more funding from
foreign banks. Even in the presence of currency risk the firm is able to borrow in
foreign currency at a lower cost because hedging reduces the required net worth.
Without transaction costs in forward markets hedging is always preferred to not
hedging and any firm that is not solvent in state H has incentives to hedge enough
to avoid financial default. This is the case when the firm uses a mixture of domestic
and foreign debt or when it borrows only in foreign currency. Note also that hedging
is beneficial only for firms that are not solvent in state H; firms with net worth above
the minimum requirement for solvency in state H do not need to hedge.
The previous equilibrium result when hedging is costless determine a particular
ordering of net worth requirements and define an equilibrium segmentation of firms
into different categories depending on their demand for bank loans and their hedging
strategy, as shown in Figure 2.2. Well-capitalized firms with net worth A > AH
finance their investment directly in foreign currency from international banks. Poorly
capitalized firms with A < AH cannot invest at all since they have no access to any
type of finance. In between, somewhat capitalized firms with AH < A < AH can
invest only to the extent that they are monitored and demand domestic bank loans.
Firms in the monitoring region [AH , AH ] finance their investment with a mixture
of domestic and foreign debt. As already mentioned, whether firms hedge their
foreign debt or not also depends on the size of their initial asset. Well-capitalized
firms need not hedge if A > ASNH but must hedge if A ∈ [AH , ASNH ]. Similarly,
somewhat capitalized firms need not hedge if A ∈ [ASNH , AH ] but must hedge if A
∈ [AH , ASNH ].
A typical firm within the monitoring region uses a mixture of domestic and foreign
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currency debt to finance its investment. However, as mentioned above, there are firms
with net worth A < AH but A + Im > I that only demand bank loans in domestic
currency and invest their excess funds outside the firm at the market rate. The
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Segmentation of firms
The distribution of net worth requirements in the equilibrium segmentation im-
plied by Lemma 2 and depicted in Figure 2.2 is:
AH < ASNH < AB < AH < ASNH
Interestingly now, within the monitoring region there are firms borrowing in do-
mestic and foreign currency, some of which must be hedged, and also firms borrowing
only in domestic currency that need not hedge. Note that in the equilibrium seg-
mentation displayed in Figure 2.2 firms may borrow only in domestic currency after
having the possibility to borrow in both currencies and not the opposite. This ap-
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parently surprising feature of the model is explained by the fact that domestic loans
are more expensive and supplied in a fixed amount due to fixed monitoring costs.
Therefore, firms in the monitoring region use the fixed amount in domestic currency
only after exhausting the possibility of borrowing in foreign currency depending on
the size of its net worth. Furthermore, firms within the monitoring region are differ-
ent from firms borrowing only in foreign currency because for the first group, bank
monitoring makes the moral hazard problem less severe.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are consistent with prior predictions in the literature, in
particular with the government guarantees approach that highlights the incentives
for firms to borrow extensively in foreign currency debt without hedging when the
exchange rate is fixed. If the fixed exchange regime is credible so that q = 0 and the
expected exchange rate at date 1 is sL = 1, there is no possibility of financial default
and the equilibrium segmentation is similar to that in the original Holmstrom and
Tirole model, with firms borrowing in foreign currency and not hedging. Another
interesting implication derived from Lemma 2 is that not all firms must hedge during
a floating regime because some of them have enough net worth to be financially
solvent even in the depreciation state.
2.4.2 Equilibrium with costly hedging (φ ≥ 0)
In the previous analysis when φ = 0 net worth requirements ANH and ANH are
irrelevant because all firms are optimally hedged. This is not the case when hedging
is costly. The next result shows that currency mismatches also arise during floating
regimes because hedging activities even if available can be unaffordable for all firms
when transaction costs in currency forward markets are sufficiently high.
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Proposition 1. With costly hedging and a positive probability of depreciation the op-
timal strategy for a firm in the monitoring region, regarding debt composition and
hedging, depends on q and φ such that:
1. When q ≥ q the firm borrows the least it can in domestic currency from local
banks and borrows the rest in foreign currency from foreign banks and does not
hedge its foreign debt.
2. When 0 < q < q and 0 < φ < (1 − q)(sH − sL) the firm finds it optimal to
borrow the least it can in domestic currency from local banks and the rest in
foreign currency from foreign banks and:
• If φ is small enough then the firm with AH < A < ASNH will always hedge
its foreign debt.
• If φ is sufficiently high then only some firms with ANH < A < ASNH hedge
its foreign debt.
3. When φ ≥ (1− q)(sH − sL) the firm finds it optimal to borrow the least it can in
domestic currency from local banks and the rest in foreign currency from foreign
banks and does not hedge its foreign debt.
Proof : See Appendix B.3
Figure 2.3 illustrates all different hedging possibilities implied by Proposition 1.
Notice that the minimum net worth requirement to obtain credit in both domestic
and foreign currency varies depending on parameters q and φ. In the first case,
extremely high probability of depreciation makes optimal hedging zero so that no
firm participates in currency forward markets. A similar situation occurs in the
third case when some firms have incentives to hedge but forward contracts are too
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Figure 2.3: Different Hedging strategies within the monitoring region.
This graph shows different cutoff levels of net worth defining different hedging strategies for firms
that use a mixture of foreign and domestic debt. In the graph AH is the minimum net worth
requirement for a firm that must hedge to be solvent, ASNH is the minimum net worth requirement
for a firm to be solvent even without hedging, and A∗ is a specific net worth requirement for firms
that must hedge when hedging is moderately costly.
not hedge, they are different and have different interpretations. Intuitively, higher
values of both q and φ increase the net worth requirement making it more difficult
to borrow in both domestic and foreign currency. In the first situation (Case a), q
is too high and the firm is forced to borrow only small amounts in foreign currency
so that it can be solvent in state H without hedging. In the third case (Case c),
however, a firm that is not solvent in state H is still able to borrow larger amounts
of foreign debt even when it cannot afford to hedge. This latter firm has a currency
mismatch in its balance sheet and would default if state H happens.
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The second case in proposition 1 corresponds to intermediate values of q and φ
which allow firms to hedge. When the cost of hedging is small enough any firm
needing to hedge to be solvent will always hedge (case b1) and the cutoff level ANH
is irrelevant. However, as the cost of hedging increases some firms have incentives to
borrow in both currencies but find it optimal not to hedge their foreign debt. Now
ANH becomes the relevant cutoff level defining the lower limit in the equilibrium
segmentation. The proof of proposition 1 describes the cutoff level A∗ below which
firms do not hedge because hedging is too costly. These firms would default in the
event of currency depreciation (case b2). This particular situation describes the case
of economies of scale in hedging operations. Firms with small net worth tend to
be highly leveraged and demand more foreign currency debt than larger firms and
cannot cover this exposure because the level of hedging required is not affordable. In
contrast, firms with higher net worth demand less foreign currency debt and require
a lower level of hedging to manage their exposure even when forward contracts are
somewhat expensive.
The preceding analysis shows that the equilibrium segmentation is determined by
endogenous net worth requirements which, in turn, depend on exogenous parame-
ters, in particular, those describing the macroeconomic environment such as interest
rates, exchange rates, probability of currency depreciation and costs of hedging. All
these parameters are the same for every firm. Hence, the investment project has a
unique segmentation in equilibrium. Depending on its initial assets, a firm deter-
mines both its debt composition and its hedging strategy by locating itself within
the segmentation. The next result illustrates how different parameters associated
with different exchange rate regimes and different stages of development in forward
markets affect the allocation of domestic and foreign debt and the hedging behavior.
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Proposition 2. When the economy moves from fixed to floating exchange rates and
in the floating regime 0 < q < q and φ < (1− q)(sH − sL), all else equal:
1. Fewer firms obtain funding for their investment.
2. Fewer firms finance their investment borrowing directly form foreign banks.
3. Some firms borrowing only in foreign currency from international banks during
the fixed exchange rate turn to local banks and demand domestic loans during
the floating regime.
Proof : See Appendix B.4
To illustrate these results, consider that in equilibrium, domestic currency borrow-
ing Im is a fixed amount and each firm in the economy demands the same minimum
amount from local banks. The aggregate demand for domestic bank loans Dm is
then:
Dm(r
∗, q) = [F (AH(r
∗, q))− F (AH(r∗, q))]Im(r∗, q)
where the individual demand Im is written as a decreasing function of both r
∗







[I − Im(r∗, q)− A]dF (A) +
∫ ∞
AH(r∗,q)
[I − A]dF (A)
Since r and q are exogenous parameters and assuming perfect competition in the
domestic banking system, the supply of domestic funds is perfectly elastic at the
domestic lending rate r and the supply of foreign loans is perfectly elastic at the
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international interest rate r∗, which means that Dm and Du determine respectively
the aggregate amounts of domestic and foreign lending in equilibrium.
An increase in q brought by the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime has
an ambiguous effect on Dm because both cutoff levels AH(r
∗, q) and AH(r
∗, q) in-
crease and there are two opposing effects. A first group of firms with insufficient net
worth and those unable to hedge cannot borrow at all and are dropped so that Dm
decreases. Some other firms turn to domestic banks and increase Dm because they
have insufficient net worth or are unable to hedge and cannot borrow only in foreign
currency.
The impact of q on Du is ambiguous as well. Firms that were previously borrowing
in foreign debt and turned to domestic debt reduce their demand for foreign currency
debt so that Du drops. However, firms with intermediate net worth and those able
to hedge remain in the monitoring region and increase their demand for foreign debt
because Im decreases for them and, as a result, Du increases. In sum, a number
of firms borrow less in both currencies and some others borrow more in foreign
currency. The extent to which these changes in the population of firms affect the
aggregate currency composition of debt depends on the distribution function F(A).
Possible changes in the population of firms after the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate regime are illustrated in the next figure.
Figure 2.4 shows that the switch in the exchange rate regime shifts the monitoring
region to the right, making it more difficult for firms to borrow in foreign currency.
Note that all net worth requirements except ASNH shift to the right when the prob-
ability of currency depreciation increases. The minimum net worth requirement for
firms that are solvent even without hedging and borrow directly from international
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Figure 2.4: Changes in the equilibrium segmentation of firms
This graph shows how the net worth requirements defining the equilibrium segmentation of firm
change when the economy moves from fixed to floating exchange rates. In the graph, AH is the
minimum net worth requirement for a firm that must hedge to be solvent and borrow in domestic
and foreign debt, ASNH is the minimum net worth requirement for a firm to be solvent even without
hedging and borrow in foreign and currency debt, AB is the minimum net worth required to borrow
only in domestic currency. AH is the minimum net worth requirement for a firm that must hedge
to be solvent and borrow directly from foreign banks, ASNH is the minimum net worth requirement
for a firm to be solvent even without hedging and borrow directly from foreign banks.
which means that firms with such large net worth are not concerned about exchange
rate risk when they borrow in foreign currency.
Figure 2.4 also illustrates that changes in hedging behavior can be significant if the
increase in the probability of depreciation is relatively small. However, depending on
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how large q and φ are, these changes could be small. For example, as q increases and
approximates to q the group of firms that hedge using currency forwards becomes
smaller and can be very small if φ is also sufficiently high as to prevent some firms
from hedging.
2.4.3 The Brazilian Experience
As a final illustration, consider how the results of the model match up with the
currency crisis in Brazil in early 1999. The model results suggest that the lack of
major changes in the borrowing behavior of the corporate sector in Brazil could reflect
a moderate increase in the probability of currency depreciation and the existence of
somewhat costless hedging. After the floating regime is adopted, some firms borrow
less in both domestic and foreign currency and some others borrow more in foreign
currency. Moreover, a group of firms borrowing in foreign currency do not hedge
either because they cannot afford to buy forward contracts or because their net worth
is sufficiently high and they are solvent even in the event of currency depreciation.
These changes in the population of firms can offset each other so that the currency
composition of debt does not vary significantly across regimes.
Needless to say, there are various other aspects of the macroeconomic environ-
ment as well as firm-specific characteristics conditioning the currency composition of
lending and the hedging behavior of firms in reality. Moreover, in contrast to what
the model assumes, a currency crisis most likely affects the firms’ net worth so that
the distribution of firms may not be constant across regimes. Furthermore, other
parameters such as the probability of success and the investment payoff R are cer-
tainly different across firms and are also affected by the collapse of the exchange rate
regime. How companies deal with higher foreign exchange risk definitely depends
on changes in these variables, treated as invariant parameters in the model. For
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example, depending on specific characteristics such as export status, type of owner-
ship or the existence of other sources of funding; firms can adopt hedging strategies
other than the use of currency forwards. Nevertheless, the model developed in the
paper suggests changes in the behavior of a representative firm and impacts on the
population of firms that are broadly consistent with the empirical facts observed in
recent currency crises in small open economies, and in particular, in Brazil over the
period 1996 to 2001.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper introduces hedging decisions in a model of optimal debt allocation
at the firm level to understand the sources of currency mismatch in the balance
sheet of the corporate sector of countries that recently faced a currency crises. The
model explains why some firms with access to foreign currency debt hedge their
currency exposure and others do not, as an optimal response to appropriate incentives
given by the macroeconomic environment. Under fixed exchange rates firms borrow
extensively in foreign currency and do not hedge because they have no incentives
to do so given that government provides a type of free risk management. Under
a floating regime, when the probability of currency depreciation is moderate and
hedging is affordable firms use currency forwards to hedge their exchange rate risk
exposure and reduce the probability of financial default. Hedging complements net
worth required by creditors allowing hedged firms to expand their capacity to access
foreign capital markets.
Despite the obvious limitations of a partial equilibrium analysis and some simpli-
fying assumptions, the model is able to provide an analytical framework to determine
endogenously the currency composition of credit and the optimal level of hedging at
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the firm level. Consistent with the empirical evidence in Brazil during 1996 to 2001,
the model predicts that with a moderate probability of currency depreciation and
somewhat costless hedging, the changes in the population of firms after the economy
adopts a floating regime can offset each other so that the currency composition of
debt does not vary significantly across regimes.
While the currency composition of debt remained stable in Brazil after the collapse
of the exchange rate regime, costless hedging operations seem to provide an effective
vehicle to reduce foreign exposure without affecting significantly the aggregate level
of borrowing. A direct policy implication of the model is then the necessary emphasis
that policymakers should give to the development of currency derivatives markets
to help the corporate sector smooth the transition to a free-floating exchange rate
regime.
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Table 2.1: Brazil: Currency Composition of Debt and Hedging Operations (in means)
Average
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Fixed ER Floating ER
Foreign Debt/Total Debt 38.1 43.2 43.6 44.6 44.8 45.1 41.6 44.8
Small 27.3 32.2 23.6 27.3 29.5 23.9 27.7 26.9
Medium 35.2 40.7 43.0 46.0 44.6 46.2 39.6 45.6
Large 53.7 58.5 63.3 58.2 59.5 63.3 58.5 60.3
Currency Derivatives/Foreign Debt 0.5 4.9 7.0 6.1 11.6 27.5 4.1 15.1
Small 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.1 0.8
Medium 0.0 5.5 7.1 7.4 8.6 22.4 4.2 12.8
Large 1.5 6.3 8.7 7.1 22.7 48.5 5.5 26.1
Note: Total debt is the sum of foreign and domestic debt and both are measured in local currency.
Currency derivatives correspond to the notional value of forwards, futures, swaps and options.
Source: Financial annual reports and footnotes to financial statements of companies publicly traded
at the São Paulo Stock Exchange Market (BOVESPA).
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Table 2.2: Brazil: Exchange Rate Exposure over time
Fixed ER Floating ER
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Number of firms 110 149 177 179 183 185
Number of firms with no financial debt 5 4 4 5 6 4
Number of firms with only domestic debt 20 29 34 36 36 40
Number of firms with dollar and domestic debt 84 114 136 135 136 137
Firms hedged using dollar derivatives 1 6 23 23 39 62
Firms not hedged 83 108 113 112 97 75
Number of firms with only dollar debt 1 2 3 3 5 4
Firms hedged using dollar derivatives 0 1 0 0 1 0
Firms not hedged 1 1 3 3 4 4
Source: Financial annual reports and footnotes to financial statements of companies publicly traded
at the São Paulo Stock Exchange Market(BOVESPA).
CHAPTER III
The Financial Effects of Real Hedging
3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the use of currency derivatives by Brazilian firms in a
period surrounding the 1999 currency crisis, and examines the effect of hedging on
firm policy and value.1 Until January 1999, Brazil had a managed exchange rate
policy (a “crawling peg”) for its currency, the real. Following a severe currency crisis,
the policy was abandoned in favor of a fully floating exchange rate in January 1999.
The economy suffered through a large recession as a result of the crisis. Many firms
in Brazil had liabilities denominated in foreign currencies (primarily US dollars),
and were now exposed to large levels of currency risk. Usage of currency derivatives
increased steadily from 1997 to 2004, our period of study, with over 40% in the
sample using currency derivatives by the end of the period.
Our setting has a number of natural advantages. First, following the radical
change in exchange rate policy and the upheaval in the economy, Brazilian firms
were in a state of disequilibrium. It would require some time for firms to determine
what their optimal policies should be in the new environment. If all firms are be-
having optimally, in equilibrium hedging should not add value.2 Put another way,
1This chapter is co-authored with Uday Rajan and Amiyatosh Purnanandam.
2For example, in the model of Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007), in equilibrium some firms hedge and others




if hedging does appear to be of value, non-hedging firms must either be behaving
sub-optimally, or perhaps have some hidden cost to hedging that is unobserved by
the econometrician. Thus, we are more likely to find that hedging has an effect in a
disequilibrium situation.
Second, the nature of the risk faced by firms is clear. In our sample, we restrict
attention to firms that had some liabilities denominated in foreign currency over the
period of study. In the fixed exchange rate period, such positions were hedged via
government policy, so to speak. Once the exchange rate was floated, firms would have
to hedge on their own to protect against a further fall in the Brazilian real. Thus,
both the source of risk and the direction of the hedge are immediate to deduce, with
a clear prediction that hedging currency risk should lead to greater foreign currency
debt. For many studies with US firms, it can be unclear whether firms are hedging
or speculating, or indeed what the nature of their exposure is. For example, a firm
using currency derivatives in the US may be concerned about a rise in the dollar (if
it is an exporter) or a fall in the dollar (if it imports any components or materials).
Finally, the crisis itself was exogenous to the actions of any particular firm, though
of course it came about as a result of a weakness in the overall economy. Since the
decision to hedge is endogenous, our setting does not completely represent a natural
experiment. Nevertheless, it is a setting in which the value of currency hedging
exogenously changed from close to zero (in the fixed exchange rate period) to a large
positive number (in the floating exchange rate period). If hedging has any value, its
value should be demonstrable when such a large shock occurs.
Why do firms hedge? Stulz (1996) suggests that the primary reason to hedge is
to reduce the likelihood of costly “left-tail” events such as financial distress or an
inability to carry out an investment policy. Leland (1998) formally demonstrates
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this motive in a dynamic capital structure model: the reduction in the probability
of financial distress leads to increased debt capacity and thus to a higher firm value
via increased interest tax shields. Empirically, Graham and Rogers (2002) examine
a sample of US firms in the period 1994–95, and suggest that firms indeed hedge to
increase debt capacity, and the resultant tax benefits add about 1.1% to firm value.
While we also find that hedging increases debt capacity and is associated with
higher value, there is a subtle difference that comes from our context. Following
the currency crisis, it is reasonable to argue that the Brazilian economy as a whole
was capital-constrained, as were firms in particular. In such an environment, foreign
currency debt, when available and hedgeable, can be a cheaper source of capital than
domestic debt.
We consider a sample of firms that have foreign currency liabilities, and so are
exposed to foreign exchange risk. We identify firms in our sample that use currency
derivatives, and tag these as “hedgers.” While hedged firms in our sample have
higher levels of foreign currency debt as compared to non-hedgers, they have lower
levels of domestic debt, so that there is a substitution away from domestic to foreign
currency debt. Of course, hedging and leverage are simultaneously determined as
part of optimal financial policy, as shown in the model of the second chapter and also
as Graham and Rogers (2002) point out. Since hedging increases only foreign debt
capacity, overall leverage proves to be a good instrument in estimating the decision
to hedge. Controlling for this endogeneity, we find that the ratio of foreign to total
debt is approximately 16% higher for hedged firms.
We further find that hedged firms are able to invest more than non-hedged firms.
Hedgers have a capital expenditure to total assets ratios about 20% higher than
non-hedgers. Thus, in our setting, hedging adds value by enabling firms to maintain
43
capital expenditures at a time of overall economic stress. The basic friction faced
by firms is a shortage of capital, which results in underinvestment by non-hedged
firms. The benefit of currency hedging is thus twofold: it provides greater access
to capital, and it provides greater access to a cheaper source of capital, foreign
currency debt. Thus, we provide evidence to support the theoretical predictions of
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), who point out that hedging can increase value
by mitigating the underinvestment problem.
Using a sample of US firms over the period 1990–95, Allayannis and Weston
(2001) estimate that on average there is a premium of 4.87% of value for firms that
use foreign currency derivatives. However, it is unclear what frictions faced by US
firms would lead to such a large premium. Muddying the waters further, Guay and
Kothari (2003) demonstrate the extent of derivative usage by US firms is small.
In their sample, a simultaneous three standard deviation change in exchange rates,
interest rates, and commodity prices will change the equity value of the median firm
by only 1.3%.
Since using derivatives is an endogenous decision, it is possible that non-users
have devised other methods of hedging. Indeed, Tufano (1996) points out that gold
firms employ many different methods of operational and financial hedging. Since we
cannot determine operational hedging techniques given our data, we use the terms
“derivative user” and “hedger” synonymously. Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000)
demonstrate the case of two gold firms with similar eventual risk exposures, though
one uses derivatives and the other a mix of methods. This again brings us back to
the idea that, in equilibrium, hedging should not add significant value.
A possible resolution for this paradox is that the hedging premium estimated by
Allayannis and Weston (2001) is not directly related to a friction that has been over-
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come, but is rather associated with the overall financial skill and savvy of the firm’s
managers. That is, derivative usage is a proxy for overall financial sophistication,
and sophisticated firms have higher value.
In our sample, we find that while derivative users and non-users have similar gross
margins, derivative users have significantly higher net incomes (both margins and net
incomes are divided by total assets to control for scale), controlling for factors such
as size and leverage. The economic magnitude here is striking, with net income being
approximately 80% higher for hedger firms. At least indirectly, we are thus able to
demonstrate that derivative usage is an important component of financial policy for
hedged firms.3
Our results on the financial performance of hedged versus unhedged firms contrast
somewhat with those of Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2002), who find that,
following the East Asian currency crisis, hedged foreign currency debt is associated
with worse financial performance of East Asian firms, whereas unhedeged debt is
not. In their work, the worse performance of firms with hedged debt is attributed in
part to illiquidity of derivative markets following the currency crisis. The difference
in our results is perhaps attributable to the longer period of our study. The bulk of
derivative usage occurs in the later years in our sample.
Overall, we find that hedger firms have a value that is 5–6% higher than that of
non-hedgers. The magnitudes of the differences in net income, capital expenditures,
and profitability support a value difference of this size. As is standard in the liter-
ature, we use Tobin’s q, or the ratio of market value of the firm to its book value,
as our measure of value. The increase in value obtains even after controlling for
unobservable firm characteristics via firm fixed effects. In a fixed effects regression,
3We do not have data on the positions and terms of derivatives held by firms, so cannot directly conduct an
analysis similar to Guay and Kothari (2003).
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identification of the coefficient on the hedger variable comes via firms that switch
from not using derivatives to using derivatives in a given year. Thus, we are able to
exploit the panel nature of our data.
Thus, in our context, derivatives add value by helping a firm overcome an identi-
fiable and large friction. An important contribution of our paper is to demonstrate
a specific channel via which hedging can add value: it increases a firm’s capacity to
take on foreign currency debt. In addition to implications for cash flows, this has a
direct effect on a firm’s cost of capital, to the extent that hedged foreign debt is a
cheaper form of capital than domestic debt at a time of extreme transition in the
economy.
In related work, Rossi (2007) examines the decision of Brazilian firms to hedge,
and their choice of instruments, over the period 1996 to 2004, using a data set that is
substantially similar to ours. Our results on the driving factors behind the hedging
decision are similar: this decision depends on the size of the firm and the extent of
foreign currency debt. While our focus is on the effect of hedging on firm value and
financial performance, in the last section of the paper, we account for the endogeneity
in the decision to hedge.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We provide some background
information on the Brazilian economy and the currency crisis in Section 3.2. Section
3.3 briefly describes our data and sources, while Section 3.4 contains the main results.
We conclude with Section 3.5.
3.2 Brazil: Macroeconomic Environment
In late 1998 and early 1999, Brazil suffered from a financial crisis that led to its
currency, the real, being fully floated on January 15, 1999. The real (denoted as
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R$) was introduced in July 1994, as part of a stabilization package known as the
Real Plan. The package included elements of privatisation and dollarisation, and was
primarily intended to control inflation (which had averaged 1,403% per year from
1990 to 1993) and foster economic growth. The plan successfully reduced inflation
to 20% by 1995. Averbug (2002) describes the motivation and implementation of
the Real Plan.
As part of the plan, important regulatory changes were also introduced in the
financial markets to reduce the controls on capital flows and improve the access of
corporations to foreign currency debt from international capital markets. With the
introduction of the real, a crawling peg exchange rate regime was adopted, with
preannounced narrow bands within which the exchange rate was maintained. In
this paper, we refer to the period before January 1999 as the “fixed exchange rate
regime.”
The years leading up to 1999 saw financial crises affect Mexico (1994), East Asia
(1997), and Russia (1998). The Brazilian economy was especially severely affected by
the Russian crisis of August, 1998, and suffered substantial capital outflows. External
aid from the IMF and the G-7 provided a breather, but capital outflows increased
again in January, 1999, leading to the fixed exchange rate regime being abandoned
in favor of a floating regime. There were continued shocks to the economy in the
floating exchange rate period, with the Argentina crisis of 2001–02 having a ripple
effect throughout Latin America, and a presidential election in 2002 contributing
some political uncertainty.
3.2.1 Exchange rate and GDP
Figure 3.1 displays the exchange rate (in real/$) and nominal GDP of Brazil over
the period 1996 through 2005. As seen from the figure, the exchange rate surged
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Figure 3.1: Brazil exchange rate and GDP, 1996 to 2005
immediately after the real was floated in January, 1999, with the value of the real
falling by about 65% within two weeks. The real/$ rate increased sharply again in
2001 and 2002. Further, compared to the orderly change in the value of the real in the
fixed exchange rate regime, in the floating era the real was significantly more volatile.
The figure also displays Brazil’s GDP from 1996 to 2005. GDP fell substantially in
2000 and 2002 as the economy experienced a severe contraction in response to the
financial crisis.
During the fixed exchange rate period of the Real Plan, Brazilian firms had bor-
rowed heavily in dollars, though the supply of foreign capital was periodically affected
by crises in other parts of the world. Of course, during this period, firms had no
incentive to hedge their exchange rate exposure, since the real-to-dollar rate was
stable and predictable. After January 1999, firms that had relied on foreign debt
were now exposed to exchange rate risk, increasing their financial vulnerability.4 In
addition, from the viewpoint of a foreign lender, loans to Brazilian companies were





Figure 3.2 displays the evolution of the “Selic,” the Brazilian Central Bank’s
overnight lending rate, from the period 1996 through 2004. Apart from a couple of
spikes corresponding to the East Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) currency crises,
























Figure 3.2: Domestic interest rate (Selic) and foreign borrowing rate
Also displayed in the figure is a proxy for the cost of foreign loans to a Brazilian
firm. This proxy is determined by the LIBOR rate plus the JP Morgan Emerging
Markets Bond Index (EMBI) spread. The EMBI spread is a global emerging markets
spread that accounts for currency and country risk. Since it is a global spread, it is
a crude proxy for the cost of foreign capital to a Brazilian firm. Nevertheless, during
the period of study, the Selic was consistently higher than the proxy cost of foreign
49
loans, suggesting that foreign currency debt was cheaper than domestic debt.
An important reason why domestic credit in Brazil may have been more expensive
than foreign credit is imperfect competition in the domestic banking sector. Suppliers
of foreign capital competed in global markets, and had to offer competitive rates.
However, the domestic banking sector had low levels of financial intermediation,
and inefficiencies in the legal system resulted in high costs of debt recovery in case of
firm defaults. Belaisch (2003) finds evidence of oligopolistic behavior in the Brazilian
banking sector. Further, during this period, the government had exhibited a tendency
to meet its financial needs by issuing high-yielded securities, possibly crowding out
investment in domestic firms. Arida, et al., (2005) suggest that high credit spreads
for Brazilian firms were mainly caused by this crowding out effect.
3.2.3 Stock market capitalization
Figure 3.3 displays the total market capitalization of the Brazilian stock market.
The market capitalization reflected a cyclical behavior that followed closely the evo-
lution of global markets and the instability associated with financial and currency
crises in emerging market economies. Compared to the fixed exchange rate regime,
market capitalization increased during the floating regime, particularly the year 2000.
On average, market capitalization increased from US$217 billion (25% of GDP) be-
fore the currency crisis in 1996 to US$ 341 billion (44% of GDP) by 2004. Overall
capitalization fell in the year preceding the currency crisis (1998) and in 2001-02,
with a short period of political uncertainty during the presidential elections in 2002.
The increase in the later years was facilitated both by the recovery of the economy
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Figure 3.3: Stock market capitalization (billions of reals)
3.3 Data
Data are collected from two sources. First, we obtain financial statement and
market value information for all Brazilian firms listed in the Economatica database
as of August, 2006. This comprises a list of more than 350 firms. We exclude financial
firms, which may use currency derivatives to hedge operational rather than financial
risk. We also exclude state-owned and foreign-owned firms, both of which may have
deep pockets.
For each of the firms contained in the database in 2006, we obtain annual financial
statements and equity market values for the period 1997 through 2004 from Econo-
matica. Thus, our data consist of large firms only, and potentially suffer from a
survivorship bias: we have no data on firms that may have gone bankrupt or been
acquired. If non-hedgers are more likely to fail, the bias works against our finding
any value to hedging.
While Economatica provides equity market values on many firms, there are several
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missing values. As a second way of determining equity values, we also determine for
each firm, and each class of share it has issued, the average daily closing price for the
last five trading days of each year. The two main classes of shares issued are “ON”
(corresponding to common stock) and “PN” (corresponding to preferred stock), with
some firms having sub-classes of each. We then determine the value of each class for
each firm by multiplying the average price times the number of shares outstanding,
and add across the classes to determine the overall market value of equity for the
firm. For many firms, there are no data on market prices. As a cross-check, we find
a high correlation between the market values from the two methods, when both are
available.
Our second source of data is BOVESPA, the Brazilian stock exchange, in São
Paulo. The BOVESPA web site provides the footnotes to the annual financial
statements over our period of study. The sets of firms listed in Economatica and
BOVESPA are different so that our overall data set is the intersection of these two
sources of information. We obtain the following items of information for each firm
and each year from the footnotes to the balance sheet: whether a firm uses foreign
exchange derivatives, whether it is an exporter, whether it has dollar assets, and the
amount of foreign debt outstanding.
Following regulation CVM No. 235, introduced on March 23, 1995, in the foot-
notes to the balance sheet a publicly traded company is required to disclose whether
it uses derivative contracts, and also the nature and face value of the contracts.5
Thus, for many firms, we can identify whether they use currency derivatives. Many
non-users explicitly mention that they do not use derivatives, whereas many firms
also do not mention derivatives at all. The latter are treated as missing values. Since
5The CVM is the Brazilian analog of the SEC in the US.
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we only know the kinds of derivative contracts used (e.g., exchange rate or currency
derivatives, and swaps, options, or forward contracts) and their notional value, but
not the terms of the contracts themselves, we create a dummy variable dderiv set to
1 if firms use foreign exchange derivatives, and zero otherwise.
Similarly, we create a dummy variable export set to 1 if a firm is an exporter,
and zero otherwise. On exports, some firms disclose data on exports as part of the
annual report to the senior administration. In other cases, firms mention they are
exporters but do not disclose information about foreign sales. The export dummy is
set to 1 in each case.
We also create a dummy variable dol set to 1 if a firm holds assets denominated in
or indexed to US dollars. Such assets include cash and deposits in foreign currency
and government bonds (treasury notes and central bank bonds indexed to the dollar).
Finally, in many cases, firms report the currency composition of their debt, from
which we determine the foreign to total debt ratio for each firm.
Our basic measure of value is the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value,
where market value is determined as the sum of book value of debt and market value
of equity, and book value is the sum of book value of debt and book value of equity.
We remove observations with missing values for market value of equity, book equity,
cash holdings, and derivative usage. Finally, we restrict the sample to firm-year
pairs in which a firm had some exposure to foreign currency risk, in terms of foreign
currency debt. We expect currency derivatives to not have any value for firms which
are not exposed to currency risk.
Our final data set is an unbalanced panel containing 167 firms and 1,023 obser-
vations (firm-year pairs). We winsorize all variables in both tails at the 1% level to
control for outliers.
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Figure 3.4 shows the number of firms in each year of our sample. The number of
derivative users grows for the first four years and levels out between 53 and 58 over
the last four years. The total number of firms grows for the first three years, and is
between 133 and 141 over the last five years.
















Figure 3.4: Number of firms in sample
3.4 Results
Our principal argument is that hedging with derivatives increases the foreign debt
capacity of a firm, which in turn increases firm value by lowering the cost of capital.
Our tests investigate both the effect of derivative usage on firm value and its effect on
the foreign debt taken on by a firm. Our measure of value is in the spirit of Tobin’s
Q and is computed as the ratio of (book value of debt plus market value of equity)
to (book value of debt plus book value of equity).
We start with a description of the key statistics of our sample firms and a uni-
variate comparison of derivative users and non-users. For the rest of the paper,
we use the term “hedgers” to mean “derivative users” and “non-hedgers” to mean
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“non-users.”
Table 3.1 presents some descriptive statistics. Panels A and B provide the mean,
median and standard deviation of some key firm characteristics of hedgers and non-
hedgers respectively, and Panel C provides the corresponding statistics for all firms.
Apart from the usual caveats that apply to univariate tests, in our exercise we also
need to keep in mind the effect of pooling observations across different years.
The univariate analysis shows some obvious differences in firm characteristics
across the two groups. Hedgers are much larger firms, both in terms of their revenue
and market capitalization. The median hedger firm’s revenue (R$ 1,214 million) is
more than five times that of the median non-hedger firm (R$ 228 million). The
median hedger firm’s book leverage (33.69%) is about 10% higher than that of the
median non-hedger firm (22.39%). Noticeably, while the domestic leverage (i.e., the
ratio of local currency debt to book value of assets) is similar at about 10% for
the median firm across the two groups, hedgers have a substantially higher foreign
currency leverage (defined as the ratio of foreign currency debt to book value of
assets). The median hedger firm has a foreign currency leverage of 20.96% as against
4.93% for the median non-hedger firm. The differences in firm size, book leverage
and foreign leverage across the two groups are all significant at 1% level. Further, we
find that hedgers keep significantly higher cash-balances as compared to non-hedgers.
We also investigate the operating profitability and capital expenditures of the
two groups. While the earnings before interest and taxes (scaled by total assets),
called margin in the table, is similar (about 20%) across the two groups, we find
that hedgers have net income to assets ratio approximately double that of non-
hedgers, and a capital expenditures to assets ratio almost 50% higher than non-
hedgers. Finally, we find that the median asset market-to-book ratio for hedgers is
55
1.01 as against 0.71 for the median non-hedger firm. This difference is significant at
1% level.
Overall, our univariate results show that hedgers are large firms with high lever-
age, especially high foreign currency debt. They seem to have similar operating
profitability as non-hedgers, but are able to invest more via capital expenditures.
In addition, their market value is significantly higher compared to their non-hedger
counterparts. Given the differences in their characteristics, it is hard to attribute this
large value difference to the usage of derivatives alone. In the rest of this Section, we
try to tease out the effect of derivatives on firm value more precisely, with a battery
of tests.
3.4.1 Valuation Effects
To isolate the effects of derivatives on firm value, we need to control for other
known drivers of value. Consider a simple dividend or earnings growth model of
firm valuation. Any variables that potentially affect either the firm’s future cash-
flows or its cost of capital are relevant for value. In particular, we include the
following controls: (i) the firm’s operating profit margin, which is a measure of its
current earnings (ii) the log of sales revenue, which we use as a proxy for firm size
throughout the paper (iii) the cash balance of the firm, which relates both to firm
risk and perhaps to future growth opportunities (iv) the growth in sales revenue,
which proxies for the expected growth rate of the firm and (v) industry and year
fixed effects. We now describe the role of each of these.
The operating profit margin of a firm is its earnings before interest and taxes
scaled by total assets, and measures its profitability prior to financial income or
expenses. This corresponds to the numerator in an earnings growth model of firm
value. Since derivatives directly affect financial income, we use operational earnings
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as our profitability control.
Next, we control for firm size. Large firms are likely to have lower risk, and thus
a lower cost of capital. Especially during an economic downturn, large firms are
expected to better withstand adverse shocks. This could happen, for example, due
to their ability to access external capital markets relatively easily or due to their more
competitive positions in product markets, as compared to small firms. We include
the log of the firm’s sales revenue as a control for market size. We find similar results
for an alternative definition of firm size based on the log of total assets of the firm.
Similarly, we also control for the firm’s cash balance. If we view cash as an extreme
form of hedging, a higher cash balance should also imply lower risk, and should be
especially valuable during these years. In addition, a high cash balance may also
proxy for better investment opportunity in the future, which can have an effect of
firm value via the growth rate.
In the spirit of the dividend growth model, we need a proxy for the expected
growth rate in the firm’s earnings. In the absence of direct growth forecasts, we use
the firm’s sales growth as a proxy for its growth potential. This variable is computed
by measuring the year-by-year percentage growth in a firm’s sales revenue.
Finally, we control for industry and year fixed-effects. Based on their primary
industry classification, we group firms into 16 industry groups and include these
dummies in the model. It is very likely that industry affiliation captures a large
component of a firm’s growth opportunities as well as its risk, and therefore its
cost of capital. Year dummies are included to control for significant changes in
macroeconomic conditions from year-to-year. Most notably, we control for the effect
of inflation in our analysis through these dummies.
Table 3.2 provides the basic regression results for the effect of currency derivative
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usage on value. In Models 1 and 2, we provide results from pooled OLS regression
estimation with firm-level clustered standard errors. Models 3 and 4 provide median
regression results, which are more robust to the effects of outliers. Consistently
across these models, we find that firm value is higher for large firms and firms with
better operating profitability. High sales growth firms and firms with high cash
balances also have higher value, but these results are statistically weak in the pooled
regression.
We find a positive and significant coefficient on dderiv, the dummy variable rep-
resenting the hedger firms. While the coefficient estimates from the OLS model are
large (in the range of 16-17%), the median regressions show that derivative users
have about 5-7% higher value than their non-user counterparts.
Since these effects are economically large, we next turn to identifying their source.
An immediate possibility is an omitted variable problem. That is, do we find these
effects because we have not been able to control for some firm-specific factor that
creates higher value and that is also positively correlated with derivative usage? For
example, better managerial ability, which is unobservable, could be one potential
candidate for an alternative interpretation of our results.
To deal with this concern, we exploit the panel nature of our data and estimate
a firm fixed effects model. In such a model, any firm-specific omitted factor that is
constant from year-to-year, including unobservable managerial skill, is automatically
controlled for. Table 3.3 provides the regression estimates from various specifications
of the fixed-effect model. Since we have firm fixed effects, we drop industry dummies
from these models. To account for correlated errors across firms in the same industry,
we cluster standard errors at the industry-level.
In the base case specification that does not include year dummies, we find a
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positive and significant coefficient of 8.28% on dderiv dummy. Derivative users seem
to gain value when they begin using derivatives. This is a powerful result since it
implicitly controls for various unobserved characteristics of the firm and is thus a
result closer to causation from hedging to firm-value. Compared to the OLS model
of Table 3.2, we find that the point estimate of dderiv has dropped by almost half in
this specification, consistent with the idea that the firm-specific unobservable factors
contribute significantly to the OLS point estimates.
In Model 2, we include year dummies and find that our results become weaker.
We need to interpret this with caution since year dummies are also correlated with
derivative usage in the Brazilian economy during this period. As the country was
adjusting to the new economic forces of a floating exchange-rate regime, firms grad-
ually started using derivative contracts over time, providing a secular time-trend in
the number of derivative users, as shown in Figure 3.4. This creates a correlation
between year dummies and derivative usage, which in turn leads to lower statistical
significance on dderiv variable.
Fixed-effect regression estimates depend closely on the year in which a firm
switches from not using derivatives to using them. To the extent that markets
can partly anticipate a firm’s overall financial policy such as raising foreign debt and
using derivative contracts to hedge the associated currency risk, it is possible that
a firm’s market value reflects these choices before the actual reporting of derivative
usage by the firm. Exploring the linkages between derivative usage and firm value
in this framework, we experiment with an alternative fixed effects model. In this
model, we assume that the market anticipates derivative usage, and therefore the
valuation effect is observed a year before the actual reporting of derivative usage by
the firm. Note that due to annual reporting requirements, we only observe derivative
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usage at the end of the year, whereas the hedging itself may have taken place at any
time during the year. In this alternative specification, which we term “lagged report-
ing,” we assign the derivative usage to the beginning of the year firm characteristics
rather than the end of the year characteristics. The results are shown in Models 3
and 4 of Table 3.3. For both models, with and without year dummies, we find that
derivative usage is associated with a 9-10% value increase, and is statistically signif-
icant. Taken all the four models together, we conclude that the firm value increases
consequent to the adoption of a derivative-based currency risk management program
by a firm. Our other results from the fixed-effect regression show that firm value
increases significantly with operating profitability and somewhat with the amount of
cash held.
3.4.2 Sources of Value Creation
Why should hedging add value? The previous section documents a strong asso-
ciation between currency derivative usage and firm value. Motivated by previous
studies, we now explore two channels via which this value creation may be taking
place: (a) the effect of derivatives on a firm’s net profitability, after controlling for
its operating profitability; and (b) the effect of derivatives on a firm’s capital expen-
ditures.
Effect on net profits
Hedging can lead to higher debt capacity, which in turn can add value to the firm
due to increased tax shields. Leland (1998) formalizes the theoretical argument, and
Graham and Rogers (2002) demonstrate this effect for US firms. In our context, we
argue that hedging currency risk leads to a higher foreign currency debt capacity. If
the domestic debt market is capital-constrained in a period of economic crisis, access
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to the foreign debt market may allow a firm to continue to raise external capital. In
addition, if foreign currency debt is cheaper due to frictions in the domestic capital
market, a higher fraction of foreign currency debt in the firm’s debt mix may lead to
a lower cost of capital and thus a higher value. These arguments suggest that hedged
foreign debt has a lower interest cost than domestic debt, and derivative usage thus
has a positive impact on a firm’s value through its direct effect on net profitability.
The univariate resuts in Table 3.1 suggest that hedgers have a net income to total
assets ratio about twice as high as non-hedgers. We now formally estimate the effect
of derivative usage on a firm’s net profitability, after controlling for the operating
profit margin.
We regress a firm’s net income to total asset ratio on dderiv and a host of control
variables. Most importantly, we control for the EBITDA to total assets ratio to
control for the effect of operating decisions on firm profit. In addition, we control for
depreciation and amortization (scaled by total assets), which will reduce net income.
We include firm size in the model to account for the effect of economies of scale on
net income. Larger firms may have a lower (per dollar) cost of raising external funds,
which in turn may lead to better profitability. Next, we control for leverage: firms
with more debt have higher interest expenses, which will mechanically drive down net
profitability. We explore the link between derivative usage and leverage in greater
detail in subsequent analysis. Since our dependent variable is a flow measure, we
take the average of beginning and end of year leverage for this regression, to control
for the effects of debt that may have been raised during the year. Finally, many
Brazilian firms have income from investments in subsidiaries, which we control for
by including the investment income to total asset ratio in the model. We include
industry and year fixed effects in all models.
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Table 3.4 provides the regression results. Models 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS
with pooled observations, and the associated t-statistics are reported after clustering
standard errors at the firm level. Models 3 and 4 use the median regression method.
As expected, we find that firms with higher operating profits, lower depreciation and
amortization expenses, lower debt, higher investment income, and larger size all have
higher net income. Controlling for these effects, the estimated coefficient on dderiv
is 1.6% in Model 1 (OLS) and 1.6% in Model 3 (Median regression), both with a
statistical significance at a level of 5% or better. That is, for every dollar of operating
profit, derivative users are able to generate a higher net income than non-users, after
controlling for the influence of several other variables that affect net income.
Where is this effect coming from? Mechanically, it clearly relates to the financial
management side of the firm’s business. In our univariate tests we find similar levels
of operating profit margins for the two groups of firms, as shown in Table 3.1. Taken
together, these results imply that hedging makes a difference at the level of financial
income and expenses of the firm. This is consistent with the notion that foreign debt,
when hedged, is cheaper than domestic debt. Thus, for a given level of leverage and
operating profit, derivative users, which have a higher proportion of foreign debt in
their capital mix, will have a higher net income than non-users.
Next, we interact dderiv with firm’s leverage and include the interaction term
in Models 2 and 4 of Table 3.4. We find a positive and significant coefficient on
the interaction term. The negative effect of leverage on net profitability remains
negative as in the earlier models. The interaction result tells us that, compared to
non-hedgers, the marginal effect of leverage on a hedger’s net profit is positive and
significant. This suggests that hedgers have a lower cost of debt, perhaps because
they can borrow a greater amount in foreign currency. We formally analyze this
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possibility in depth in later sections.
Effect on capital expenditure plan
We next consider the effect of derivatives on capital expenditures. Froot, Scharf-
stein, and Stein (1993) suggest that hedging minimizes the frictions associated with
raising external financing and thereby allows a firm to maintain a smooth invest-
ment policy. In particular, the sensitivity of investment to a firm’s internal profit
should be lower for hedgers as compared to non-hedgers. This is especially true in
our sample, since the entire economy is passing through a major transition. During
such a period, scarcity of internal funds and poor health of the domestic banking
sector have the potential to severely hamper a firm’s investment plan.
We estimate the effect of currency derivative usage on a firm’s capital expenditure
(scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets). In these regressions, we control for the
firm’s operating profit (EBIT), size (the log of sales revenue), and leverage (to capture
the effect of capital structure on investment policy). We include year and industry
dummies to capture the effects of the macroeconomic environment and industry-
specific growth opportunities. The results are presented in Table 3.5. In Models
1 and 2, we present a pooled OLS specification, whereas Models 3 and 4 provides
median regression estimates.
The coefficients on dderiv in Models 1 and 3 suggest that hedgers invest about
1.3–1.2% (as a proportion of total assets) more than non-hedgers. The univariate
results in Table 3.1 show that the average level of capital expenditure in our sample
is about 6.3%. Therefore, compared to the average firm in the sample, the mean
hedger firm invests about 20% more than its non-hedger counterpart. The other
coefficients in these models indicate that firms invest more when they have higher
internal profits and higher size, though the latter results are statistically insignificant
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in the OLS specifications.
In Models 2 and 4, we drop the profitability margin from the regression, and
instead include two interaction variables in the model: (a) margin interacted with
dderiv and (b) margin interacted with 1−dderiv. The first interaction term captures
the sensitivity of capital expenditures to internal profits for derivative users, whereas
the second term does that for non-users.6 This allows us to estimate the sensitivity
of investments to internal profits across the two groups and provides a cleaner test of
the theory of Froot, et al. (1993). With this model specification, the coefficient on
dderiv is larger and more strongly significant. More importantly, we find a positive
and significant coefficient of 6.26% on the interaction of margin with the non-hedger
dummy, and statistically zero coefficient on the interaction with the hedger dummy.
That is, the investment-cash-flow sensitivity of derivative users is zero, whereas it is
positive for the non-users. Consistent with Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), we
find that derivative users’ capital expenditure policy is insulated from the availability
of internal funds, whereas the same is not true for non-users.
A large literature has investigated the sensitivity of investments to cash flows.
Alternative interpretations have been offered to the empirical finding of a positive
coefficient on internal cash flows in an investment regression, including (i) firms face
financial constraints, and therefore depend on internal funds to undertake capital
expenditures, and (ii) when cash-flows are high, firms have better investment oppor-
tunities, which in turn produces a positive correlation between investments and cash
flow. In our regressions, we control for industry-specific effects, so it is hard to argue
that high cash flow proxies for a better investment opportunity set for non-hedgers.
Rather, it appears that using of derivatives eases access to external capital, and thus
6We obtain similar results when we interact derivative usage or lack thereof with EBITDA rather than EBIT.
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makes a firm’s investment less sensitive to shocks to internal funds.
Summarizing the results from capital expenditure and net profitability regressions,
we find that (a) derivative users are able to generate higher profits for every dollar
of operating profits they have, (b) derivative users seem to have low-cost debt in
their portfolio and (c) their investment plans are less sensitive to their own funds,
perhaps due to easier access to external funds. What could possibly explain these
findings? We conjecture that using currency derivatives allows firms to borrow more
in foreign currency, which is a cheaper source of capital. Access to the local currency
debt market may be limited for all firms in the period of the economic crisis, so that
access to foreign currency debt mitigates the effects of credit rationing. We provide
empirical evidence to this hypothesis in the remainder of the paper.
3.4.3 Derivatives and foreign debt capacity
We estimate the effect of derivatives on the ratio of foreign currency debt to total
debt for a firm. Before presenting the formal analysis, we note that firms are likely to
use dollar derivatives and foreign currency debt in conjunction, and therefore these
two decisions are determined jointly. In an extreme case, it can be argued that the
regression results from an estimation of foreign currency debt to total debt ratio on
dollar derivatives can be entirely driven by reverse causation. Later in the paper,
in Section 3.4.5, we carefully account for this possibility in our paper. We therefore
defer a serious discussion of endogeneity to the later section.
We model the ratio of foreign debt to total debt for each firm in each year as
a function of currency derivative usage and several control variables. The controls
include firm size as large firms are expected to have better access to various sources
of funds including foreign currency debt. Our other control variables are motivated
by two broad economic arguments. First, we firm may have natural hedges that
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reduce the dollar risk arising from its debt portfolio. An export-oriented firm, for
example, may have a natural advantage in borrowing in foreign currency debt. We
include a dummy variable export that equals one if a firm reports export income in
its footnotes, zero otherwise. Several Brazilian firms also hold financial assets linked
to the US dollar. These include foreign currency accounts as well as domestic bonds
indexed to the US dollar. We include a dummy variable dol that equals one for
firms with dollar assets, zero otherwise. Our second set of controls are motivated
by the studies on the determinants of leverage in general (see Titman and Wessels
(1988) and Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) for example), and are included
these controls in the regression to ensure that our results are not simply driven by
incentives to raise more debt. These control variables capture the effects of growth
options, profitability, asset tangibility and non-debt tax shields enjoyed by the firm.
As a proxy for growth options, we include sales growth, measured as the year-by-
year percentage growth in sales revenue. Asset tangibility is captured by the ratio
of Property, Plant and Equipment to total assets. We include depreciation and
amortization scaled by total assets as a control for non-debt tax shields.
Table 3.6 provides the regression estimates. In Models 1-3, we provide OLS es-
timates with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Industry and year fixed
effects are included as well. We find a positive and significant coefficient on dderiv
suggesting that derivative users have higher foreign debt in their liability. The point
estimates suggest that derivative users have about a 17–18% higher foreign currency
debt ratio than their non-user counterparts. In Model 4, we estimate a firm fixed
effects model and obtain a coefficient of 6.77% on dderiv, which is significant at the
1% level.
Recall that we have required, as a sample selection criterion, that all firms in our
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sample have some foreign currency debt. This ensures that all our firms face some
degree of exchange rate risk with respect to R$-US$ exchange rate. However, it is
plausible that our results suffer from a simultaneous equations bias: firms with large
foreign debt are more likely to hedge. We next use an instrumental variable model to
address this issue and to estimate the effect of derivatives on foreign currency debt
net of the reverse causation effect. We model the foreign currency debt ratio and
currency derivative usage both as endogenous variables. The first-stage regression
(the dderiv equation) requires a reasonable model of the derivative usage decision.
As a precursor to our instrumental variable regression, therefore, we next estimate a
hazard rate model of the determinants of derivative usage.
3.4.4 Hazard rate model of derivative usage
Theoretical models suggest that firms use derivatives to minimize frictions such as
bankruptcy costs, financial distress, costly external financing and managerial incen-
tives (see, for example, Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein, and
Stein (1993)). Much of our empirical understanding about why firms use derivatives
is driven by studies based on US firms (such as Geczy et al. (1997) and Purnanan-
dam (2007)). Bartram et al. (2007) provide evidence from international data by
investigating derivative usage across number of countries.
Many empirical studies in this area are based on cross-sectional data or data
points with a limited time-series. Since we have a panel data, as a by-product of our
research we estimate a richer model to capture the dynamic behavior of why firms
hedge. There are likely to be high fixed costs to establishing a hedging program,
which include hiring sophisticated managers and learning about various hedging
options and how the contracts work. Once these costs are incurred, it is likely that
a firm will continue to hedge in the future.
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We therefore model a firm’s decision to hedge in a Cox-proportional hazard rate
framework. This framework, often used in the bankruptcy prediction literature (see
Shumway (1997)), estimates the probability of hedging by a firm conditional on the
fact that it has not hedged as yet. The coefficient estimates tell us the effect of
various firm characteristics on a firm’s decision to begin hedging in the next year,
given that it has not hedged in the past.
The Cox-proportional hazard model assumes that the hazard rate for firm j at
time t (i.e., firm j’s probability of using derivatives at time t conditional on it being
a non-user so far) is the following:
h(t|xj) = h0(t)exp(xj,t−1βj)
In this equation, xj,t−1 refers to the firm characteristics at the end of year t − 1
that are likely to be associated with a firm’s decision to hedge using derivatives
in year t. h0, called the baseline hazard function, represents the hazard ratio for
a hypothetical firm that assumes a value of zero uniformly for all xj. Using this
functional framework, the model is estimated using a maximum likelihood estimate
(see Cox (1972) for estimation details) to obtain the β coefficients.
For this estimation all the level variables (such as firm size and leverage) are
measured as of the beginning of the year. Thus, the interpretation of our results is
in a predictive sense. Motivated by earlier theoretical work and empirical studies
based on US data, we include firm size as a proxy for economies of scale and access
to derivatives market in the Cox-model. We include leverage to control for hedging
motivations emerging from financial distress concerns. We also include the squared
value of leverage in our model, to control for the fact that the decision to hedge
may be concave in leverage: firms with very high leverage may have no incentive to
hedge even when faced with higher expected bankruptcy costs (see Purnanandam
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(2007)). Since holding cash is an alternative way to hedge, we control for a firm’s
cash balance. Annual sales growth captures the effects of growth opportunities in
the spirit of Froot, et al. (1993). Finally, we include dol, the dollar asset dummy,
and export, the export dummy, to account for sources of natural hedges.
Table 3.7 presents the estimation results. We find that larger firms and high
growth firms are more likely to use derivatives, as reported by Geczy, et al. (1997) in
their sample of large US firms. Further, firms with high cash balances are more likely
to use derivatives, suggesting that these two hedging methods are complementary.
Finally, we find a strong non-monotonic relation between leverage and derivative
usage. At low leverage levels, the likelihood of using derivatives is increasing in
leverage, but the pattern reverses for highly-levered firms. This finding is consistent
with the theoretical and empirical findings of Purnanandam (2007), who reports a
similar non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging for US firms.
Therefore, the key drivers of a firm’s hedging decision in Brazil seem to be in
line with what other authors have found among US firms. Our results provides an
econometric improvement over earlier studies as they exploit the panel nature of our
data, and can be taken as an out-of-sample evidence for some of the earlier work on
derivative usage.
3.4.5 Instrumental variable regression
We now turn to the issue of establishing a causal relation from derivative us-
age to foreign debt ratio in a simultaneous equation framework. For the first-stage
regression, we need reasonable instruments for derivative usage. Our hazard rate re-
gressions demonstrate that variables such as leverage and leverage-squared are strong
predictors of derivative usage in our sample. In unreported analysis, we find that
leverage terms (especially the square) do not have strong explanatory power in ex-
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plaining a firm’s foreign currency debt to total debt ratio, after we control for the
effect of derivatives and other variables that enter various models in Table 3.6. Thus,
we exploit the non-monotonicity between leverage and hedging and use leverage and
leverage-squared as instruments for derivative usage in the first stage regression. We
also include the cash balance (as a ratio of total assets) as an instrument.
Since derivative usage is a binary variable, at the first stage, we estimate a Probit
model for the choice of derivative usage. This ensures that the fitted values will
lie between zero and one. As suggested by Maddala (1983, pages 244-245), we then
take the linear projection of first stage estimates and substitute it into a second stage
OLS regression with foreign debt to total debt ratio as the dependent variable. The
second stage standard errors are corrected for the two-stage estimation bias. Table
3.8 presents the second-stage results for IV model. Our first stage estimates (not
reported) are similar to the estimates from the Cox-model. In addition, we check for
the validity and strength of our instruments. The partial R-squared measures the
improvement obtained in the model’s fit in the first-stage regression by including the
instruments. As reported in the table, we are able to explain over 7% of variation
in the first stage regression by the addition of our instruments. The χ2 statistic
confirms that the excluded instruments are jointly significant.
Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.8 show that, controlling for endogeneity, we obtain a
point estimate between 6–7% on the effect of derivative usage on the foreign currency
debt ratio. As in the OLS model, the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. The
magnitude of the coefficients is in line with that reported in Table 3.6 in the firm
fixed effects specification (Model 4). While these coefficients are less than half as
large as the corresponding OLS coefficients (which are about 16–17%), overall we
find that using derivatives does lead to a higher foreign debt capacity for a firm.
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3.4.6 Economic significance
Our OLS estimates from Table 3.2 show that derivative users have about a 17%
higher value than non-users, which is very large. The median regressions in the same
table, which are less sensitive to outliers, estimate this effect at 5-6%. The fixed effect
regressions in Table 3.3 control for firm-specific unobservables, and suggest that the
valuation effect of derivative usage is in the range of 6-10%. Are these economic
magnitudes plausible? Using our conservative estimates, can derivative instruments
add 5–6% value to a firm?
We argue that derivatives may add value both via their effect on cash flows, and,
indirectly, via their effect on foreign debt capacity and thus the cost of capital for
a firm. The currency shocks faced by the Brazilian economy in the period following
the switch to the floating exchange rate regime in early 1999 are substantial. With
segmented capital markets, foreign capital, if available to a firm, is cheaper and
thus of value. In our sample, derivative usage appears to have an impact on the
profitability of a firm as well as its access to foreign debt.
When we investigate the effect of derivatives on financing and operating policies
of the firm, we find that derivative users have a ratio of net income to total assets
that is higher by about 1.6% compared to non-users, after controlling for operating
profits, investment income and level of debt. The average non-user has a net income
to total asset ratio of about 2% in our sample. Thus, the derivative users are able
to generate about an 80% higher income than non-users, which is an economically
large number. We find that at least a part of this can be explained by higher foreign
debt in their debt mix. We find that derivative users have about a 7% higher ratio
of foreign to total debt compared to non-users. The average ratio for non-users in
the sample is about 42%, implying an increase in the ratio of over 16%. Finally, we
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also find that derivative users invest about 1.2% more than the non-user firms, an
increase of more than 20% compared to the average non-user.
Overall, therefore, we find derivative usage to be associated with an 80% higher
net profit after controlling for operating profits, a 16% higher foreign to total debt
ratio and a 20% higher capital expenditure as compared to the average non-user
firm. These are all economically large numbers. While the net profit and capital
expenditures directly capture the effects on current and future cash flow, the foreign
to total debt ratio affects the cost of capital for firms as well. Given the magnitudes
of these numbers, the 5–6% value difference that we conservatively report for deriva-
tive users is certainly plausible. In our context, when the economy passes through
extreme adverse shocks, derivative usage becomes particularly important, and add
considerable value to a firm by allowing it to have smooth financing and operating
policies.
3.5 Conclusion
The Brazilian currency crisis of 1999 represents a natural setting in which to study
the effects of corporate financial policy on firm performance and value. The switch
to a floating exchange rate in January 1999 was followed by periods of high volatility
and rapid depreciation of the real. We study a sample of 167 Brazilian firms that all
have some foreign currency debt, and examine the effect of hedging with derivatives
on a firm’s financial performance and its value.
We find that foreign currency hedging is positively correlated with the value of
a firm, as measured by the ratio of market value to book value. In our sample, all
firms have some debt denominated in foreign currency, so are exposed to exchange
rate risk. In a pooled regression, derivative usage is associated with approximately
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a 7 to 10% increase in firm value.
We identify some specific channels via which hedging is valuable. First, it increases
the ability of a firm to take on foreign currency debt. It is likely that, in the aftermath
of the economic crisis, domestic capital is scarce and hedged foreign debt is cheaper.
Second, hedging allows a firm to continue making capital expenditures regardless of
its current profitability (as measured by EBIT).
Of course, the decision to hedge is endogenous. A hazard rate model suggests
that the decision to begin using derivatives depends on, among other variables, total
leverage (i.e., the ratio of total debt to assets) and the square of leverage. Indeed, we
find that these are good instruments for derivative usage. Using these instruments,
we find that derivative usage leads to an approximately 7% increase in the ratio of
foreign debt to total debt.
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Firm characteristics Across Derivative Users and Non-Users
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Panels A and B provide the
descriptive statistics for the non-users and users of derivatives, respectively. Panel C provides the
corresponding number for all firms pooled across the two groups. All the summary statistics are
pooled across sample years starting in year 1998 and ending in 2004. Revenue is the sales of a
firm represented in millions of R$. MarketCap denotes the market capitalization of the firm’s
equity in millions of R$ computed by multiplying the number of shares by year end share price.
Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to book value of assets. Domestic and Foreign leverage
represent the ratio of local currency borrowings and foreign currency borrowings to the book value
of total assets, respectively. Market/Book ratio of assets is computed as the ratio of (book value
of debt + market value of equity) to (book value of debt + book value of equity). Market/Book of
equity represent the ratio of market value of equity (i.e., market capitalization) to its book value.
Margin denotes the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of total assets.
Net Income/TA denotes the ratio of net income to book value of total assets. Quick measures the
ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Cash/TA measures the cash-holdings as a fraction of
book value of total assets. Capex represents the ratio of capital expenditure to the one-year lagged
value of total assets. The number of observations for Capex variable is lower than other variables as
it requires total assets from the previous year in denominator. Columns labeled as N , Median and
Mean represent the number of observations, median and mean, respectively. Std.Dev. represents
the standard deviation.
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Table 3.1: Firm characteristics Across Derivative Users and Non-Users
Variable N Median Mean Std.Dev.
Panel A: Non-Users
Revenue 715 228.2370 523.6458 856.4104
Market Cap 715 66.7580 322.2439 871.4893
Leverage 715 0.2239 0.2378 0.1781
Domestic Leverage 715 0.1085 0.1415 0.1407
Foreign Leverage 715 0.0493 0.0964 0.1194
Market/Book (Asset) 715 0.7131 0.8303 0.5687
Market/Book (Equity) 715 0.5075 1.0299 2.0840
Margin 715 0.1987 0.2216 0.1537
Net Income/TA 715 0.0200 0.0187 0.0954
Quick 715 1.3496 1.7553 1.5261
Cash/TA 715 0.0327 0.0711 0.0926
Capex 625 0.0401 0.0555 0.0625
Panel B: Users
Revenue 308 1214.3945 2553.1309 3530.5675
Market Cap 308 617.4578 2108.4502 3811.1485
Leverage 308 0.3369 0.3447 0.1296
Domestic Leverage 308 0.1028 0.1213 0.0852
Foreign Leverage 308 0.2096 0.2233 0.1243
Market/Book (Asset) 308 1.0122 1.1957 0.6746
Market/Book (Equity) 308 1.0296 1.5685 2.0124
Margin 308 0.2165 0.2437 0.1364
Net Income/TA 308 0.0410 0.0391 0.0710
Quick 308 1.2510 1.3686 0.6451
Cash 308 0.0613 0.1074 0.1124
Capex 284 0.0602 0.0784 0.0678
Panel C: All Firms
Revenue 1023 411.2240 1134.6736 2263.6956
Market Cap 1023 134.7062 860.0264 2359.1912
Leverage 1023 0.2744 0.2700 0.1721
Domestic Leverage 1023 0.1055 0.1354 0.1269
Foreign Leverage 1023 0.1052 0.1346 0.1341
Market/Book (Asset) 1023 0.8025 0.9403 0.6251
Market/Book (Equity) 1023 0.6220 1.1921 2.0765
Margin 1023 0.2043 0.2283 0.1490
Net Income/TA 1023 0.0268 0.0248 0.0892
Quick 1023 1.3269 1.6389 1.3355
Cash 1023 0.0391 0.0820 0.1003


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.8: Derivatives and Foreign Currency Debt: IV Regression
This table presents regression estimates from Instrumental Variable regressions of firm’s foreign
currency debt on derivative usage and control variables. The dependent variable in the regression
is the ratio of foreign currency debt to the total debt of the firm. The endogenous variable is
the derivative usage of firm, dderiv. We estimate the model using IV regression technique. In
the first stage dderiv is instrumented with firm’s leverage, its squared term, lev − squared and
firm’s cash holdings, cash/TA. The explanatory variables are defined as follows: logsize is the
natural logarithm of the firm’s total revenue for the prior year. margin is computed as the ratio
of Earnings before Interest and Taxes for the same fiscal year scaled by the year end total assets.
dep/TA measures the Depreciation and Amortization scaled by the beginning of the year book value
of total assets. export is a dummy variable that equals one for the exporters, zero otherwise. dol
is a dummy variable that equals one for firms that hold dollar assets, zero otherwise. salesgrowth
represents the percentage growth in year-by-year revenue of the firm. ppe/TA is the ratio of firm’s
permanent assets (plant,property and equipment) to the total assets. Robust t-statistics adjusted
for firm level clustering are given in brackets under column t-Statistic. We provide the statistics
from the first-stage estimation in the last three rows. Partial R2 measures the improvement in
adjusted (pseudo) R-squared obtained by including the instruments in the first stage Probit model
of derivative usage. Chi-squared statistics test for the joint significance of all excluded instruments.
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
logsize .0339 (2.68) 0.0420 (2.84)
margin -0.0710 (-1.20) -0.0905 (-1.15)
dderiv 0.0715 (4.37) 0.0618 (3.27)
export 0.1130 (6.05) 0.1044 (5.14)




intercept 0.1345 (0.72) 0.0419 (0.19)
R2 0.3251 0.3325
N 992 947
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies no no
Partial R2 0.0729 0.0851
Chi-squared Stat 74.70 64.92
CHAPTER IV
Corporate Hedging Strategies in Brazil: Are they effective?
4.1 Introduction
After the currency crisis in January 1999, an increasing number of companies in
Brazil have become active in purchasing financial derivatives to manage their foreign
exchange exposure. This chapter extends the analytical framework developed in
the second chapter to investigate how companies use different hedging strategies to
mitigate the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on their financial operations.
By conducting a close examination of the explanatory notes to consolidated fi-
nancial statements and annual reports, the chapter presents a case study of two
Brazilian companies over the period 1997 through 2004. The purpose of the case
study is twofold. First, it provides an overview of different hedging strategies to
illustrate how risk management operations are executed in practice. Second, by
comparing theoretical arguments and companies’ real strategies, the paper attempts
to answer whether these risk management policies have been effective in mitigating
exchange rate risk. Among other advantages, this case study method provides a bet-
ter understanding of risk management activities, some institutional details involved
in the hedging process in Brazil and the identification of specific motivations involved
at the firm level.
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Companies are exposed to a variety of operational, financial and market risks
inherent to their own businesses and also to the behavior of the aggregate economy.
For example, a firm doing international business benefits from a depreciating currency
when it sales to foreign markets. However, the firm faces higher operating costs if it
imports intermediate goods from abroad. On the other hand, a company’s financial
performance may be affected when the supply of foreign capital decreases as a result
of the country’s political instability or when domestic borrowing is reduced during
times of economic downturn or as a consequence of financial crises.
During the period of study, Brazil experienced severe macroeconomic shocks and
firms were exposed to different sources of risks. The focus in this study, however,
is exchange rate risk and how companies deal with it. As descriptive examples, two
companies are studied: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional and Votorantim Celulose e
Papel. Although they belong to different industries, both companies have sufficiently
large foreign currency operations that expose them to foreign exchange risk. Among
several candidates, these two companies were chosen because they have the most
complete set of information (significant quantity and quality of information) sufficient
for detailed description and further evaluation of the companies’ risk management
policies.
The main findings of the case study are consistent with theory. The behavior of
the two companies studied is consistent with the model of optimal debt composition
and hedging and with empirical evidence about the financial effects of hedging in
Brazil of the previous chapters. Firms use financial derivatives, mainly cross-currency
swaps, and holdings of foreign currency denominated assets to protect against further
currency devaluation. By reducing the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on net
income, hedging helps smooth earnings, increase the firm’s capacity to borrow in
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foreign currency at lower cost and secure funding to the firm’s planned investment.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 extends the
model of the first chapter to incorporate alternative hedging activities. Sections 4.3
and 4.4 present the case study in Companhia Siderurgica Nacional and Votorantim
Celulose e Papel respectively. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Optimal debt composition and different methods of hedging
The model of optimal debt composition and hedging of the second chapter shows
that currency mismatches in the balance sheet of companies may be reduced after a
currency crisis, without having firms borrowing less in foreign debt. When affordable,
currency forwards are used to deal with exchange rate risk and reduce the probability
of financial default brought by currency fluctuations. Hedging complements net
worth and collateral requirements allowing firms to expand their capacity to access




sH − F − φ
≤ h ≤ R−Rm − sLRu
F − sL + φ
The lower limit value in this expression is determined by the firm’s exposure when
the exchange rate is sH (e.g. the devaluation state) and the upper limit when the
exchange rate is sL (e.g. non-devaluation state). The exchange rate is quoted as units
of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency (e.g. Brazilian real per US dollar),
h is the amount of forward contracts in foreign currency, φ is the cost of hedging,
Rm is the payment to local banks for domestic currency loans and Ru the payment
to international banks for foreign currency debt. R is the investment project return,
and R(sH) and R(sL) what the firm is left with after debt payments.
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With positive but small cost of hedging φ the firm chooses:
(4.2) h =
sHRu +Rm −R
sH − F − φ
If R is taken as the firm’s operating profits, equal to net domestic sales (domestic
sales minus domestic operating costs) plus net exports (foreign sales minus imports of
intermediate goods), 1 then it is clear that when companies expect the local currency
to depreciate, larger revenues from net exports are a natural hedge and substitute
for a long position in forward contracts. 2
Another hedging method, investment in foreign currency assets, can be introduced
in the model as an alternative investment opportunity paying the risk free rate rf . If
markets are efficient and interest parity condition holds, the firm must be indifferent
between investing such funds in domestic currency at rf and investing them in foreign
currency at the international rate r∗.
Why would a firm want to invest part of its funds outside the investment project
when the expected return from the project is greater than the risk free rate? This
could occur either because another distortion is in place (e.g. the firm may be risk
averse and has a motivation to hold a buffer stock that pays for increased exchange
rate risk) which is a real possibility not explicitly considered in the model, or be-
cause costly hedging can induce the firm to borrow less in foreign currency, which
is equivalent in the model, to have part of the borrowed funds invested at the same
rate paid for its debt. Thus, in the context of the model, when forward contracts
are too costly, investing in foreign currency assets is an alternative hedging strategy
1This is similar to the formulation Martinez and Werner (2001) used to study the impact of net exports on the
ratio of foreign currency debt to total debt for Mexican firms between 1992 and 2000. It assumes that export prices
are fixed in the foreign currency.
2Currency appreciation is not explicitly model in this analytical framework. However, more realistically, in such
situation net exports represent an additional source of exposure. Therefore, hedging would require either a reduction
in net exports or a short position in forward contracts.
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because it reduces the amount of debt exposed to exchange rate risk.
The model of the second chapter is then consistent with actual currency risk man-
agement operations at the firm level such as the use of revenues from net exports, as a
natural hedge, and investment in foreign currency assets, both working as alternative
methods to the use of currency forwards. In what follows and to distinguish among
these financial strategies, derivative hedging will refer to the use of currency for-
wards (or any other derivative such as swaps, options or futures) and non-derivative
hedging will refer to holdings of foreign currency assets or revenues from net exports.
Aside from the model implications, a vast literature in corporate finance provides
theoretical arguments for why firms hedge. For example, firms may have incentives
to hedge because hedging operations provide a tool to reduce the risk of financial
distress (Stulz and Smith, 1985 and Leland, 1998). Firms may also hedge to smooth
earnings exposed to exchange rate fluctuations and by that improve its business op-
portunities (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). As seen in chapter three, empirical
evidence based on a sample of 167 non-financial firms in Brazil seems to indicate
that, consistent with financial theory, financial hedging has positive and significant
effects on firms’ investment and profitability. By smoothing firms’ earnings, hedging
increases their debt capacity in foreign currency.
4.2.1 Types of Financial Exposure
A firm’s currency exposure can be classified as follows:
1. Translation or accounting exposure, which results from the need to translate
foreign currency financial statements of affiliates in other countries into sin-
gle reporting currency in consolidated financial statements. For example, U.S.
branches operating in Brazil need to translate financial statements originally
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prepared in Brazilian real into U.S. dollar. Any adjustment resulting from dif-
ferences between assets and liabilities is usually recognized in an equity account
on the balance sheet.
2. Transaction exposure, which arises from transactions denominated in foreign
currency such as borrowing and lending when repayment is to be made in cur-
rencies other than the local currency. This is the most common type of exposure
that firms try to mitigate mechanically by hedging.
3. Operating or economic exposure, which results from competition in the market
when the company experiences changes in the present value of its cash flows
caused by unexpected exchange rate movements. For example, companies have
part of their revenues denominated in foreign currency when they sell goods
abroad and also part of their costs are affected by currency fluctuations because
the firm may import intermediate goods.
The case studies in this chapter focus on transaction exposure, among other things,
because it is easier to identify and measure and also because it is the main type
of exposure derivative hedging is aimed at eliminating. As will be seen, Brazilian
companies hedge their transaction exposure posed by their transactions denominated
in foreign currency (imports, exports, debt and acquisition of foreign assets) using
both financial derivatives (futures, forwards, options and swaps) and also holdings of
assets denominated in foreign currency. In some cases, firms refer to export revenues
as an alternative means providing a natural hedge to economic exposure.
4.2.2 Hedging as a means of transactional exposure management
Hedging is a financial transaction by which the firm takes a position, either ac-
quiring an asset or a contract (e.g. forward contract, swap contract, etc) that will
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rise or fall in value with an expected movement in the exchange rate to offset the
drop or rise in value of an existing position.
The most common derivative transaction used by Brazilian companies is a swap
contract. It consists of the exchange of two currencies at a given exchange rate with
an agreement to reverse the trade at the same exchange rate or any prespecified
rate at some date in the future. In this contract, one party pays the other annual
interest payments. Given that in an emerging market like Brazil companies have
access to borrow in foreign currency from offshore markets, at floating rates such as
the LIBOR rate, instead of the plain vanilla currency swap described above, most
companies use a cross-currency interest rate swap contract, with an arrangement
similar to an interest rate swap.
Under a cross currency interest rate swap, the company exchanges with a bank its
foreign debt, say U.S. dollars contracted at floating rates, for local debt contracted
at rates in Brazilian real (e.g. CD rate) at a given exchange rate (e.g. forward rate).
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the cross currency swap is implemented.
In the figure, a Brazilian firm has U.S. dollar debt for US$ 100 at 1 year maturity.
Due to expected depreciation of the real, the firm wants to swap this debt for real-
denominated debt since most of its earnings are determined in real.
Suppose today the firm enters into a 1 year cross currency swap contract with a
commercial bank, exchanging US$ debt into real debt at a forward rate F (real/US$).
On each interest payment day, the firm pays the bank interest at the domestic rate
equal to the Brazilian CD rate. The company receives from the bank US$ interest
equivalent to the LIBOR rate plus margin. These payments are used to continue
paying interest on its US$ debt. Whether or not the notional amount is exchanged




  Bank 
US$: LIBOR + margin 
Real: CD rate 
 US$ debt 
US$: LIBOR 
 + margin 
On loan maturity date, the Brazilian firm pays the 
Bank the notional amount in Real and receives from 
the bank the notional amount in US$. 
Brazilian Firm 
Figure 4.1: Cross Currency Interest Rate Swap
US$ is exchanged, the firm pays F*100 in real and receives from the bank US$ 100.
At the date of the financial report (e.g. end of the fiscal year) gains or losses on
the swap contract will depend on whether the exchange rate is greater or less than
F. If S > F then the swap contract gives a net gain of (S − F ) ∗ 100 real. If F > S
then the swap contract gives a loss of (F −S) ∗ 100 real. This gain or loss offsets the
open position the firm has in US$.
Although the theoretical model of debt composition and hedging uses forward
contracts as the only derivative hedging tool, both currency swaps and cross-currency
swaps are consistent with this assumption. Swap contracts can be thought as a series
of forward contracts or as two simultaneous transactions, one in the spot market
(exchange of notional values at the beginning) and the other in the forward market
(exchange of notional values at maturity using a contracted rate). When there is
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no exchange of initial notional values then the swap contract is more similar to the
forward contract, except for the fact that interest payments are also exchanged.
More important, from the model perspective, is the operating difference between
derivative hedging and investment in foreign currency assets. When firms are exposed
to exchange rate risk, both methods provide financial income to offset exchange rate
losses in case of currency depreciation. However, when the firm takes a position in
the swap contract, there is no need for holding on the principal amount exchanged.
Moreover, these funds can be used to finance productive investment, which has a
higher expected return than investment in foreign currency assets.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the model of debt composition and hedging
determines an optimal amount of derivative hedging as a function of the expected
cost of capital and the size of the firm’s net worth. This optimal hedging is not
necessarily equal to the total amount of foreign currency debt. Moreover, derivative
hedging can be zero even when the firm borrows extensively in foreign currency if
the firm has large enough net worth.
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4.3 Case Study in Companhia Siderurgica Nacional
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional is the second largest steel-producer in Brazil and
one of the largest steel makers in Latin America. Companhia Siderurgica Nacional
(CSN) operates in the steel and iron sector, manufacturing a wide range of value-
added steel products, such as hot-dip galvanized sheets and tin mill products. CSN
runs its own source of iron ore, limestone and dolomite mines, in the State of Minas
Gerais, Brazil, where the company is located. Using imported coal, CSN produces
approximately 75 to 80% of its coke requirements in its own coke batteries. The
company was privatized in 1993. During most of the 1990s, CSN experienced a large
expansion process, part of which included strategic investments in railroads and
power supply companies. As a result, at present CSN is a fully integrated company.
4.3.1 Market Share, customers, competitors and Exports
During 2004, Brazil was the eighth largest crude steel producer in the world
with a production output of 32.9 million tons, equivalent to 3% of total world steel
production. Brazil accounted for approximately half of total steel production in Latin
America, approximately twice the size of Mexico’s and approximately one-third the
size of the U.S. steel production. As shown in Table 4.1, in the domestic market
CSN is the second most important steel maker with a total production of 5.5 million
of tons, about 17% of the total steel production in Brazil.
As a highly competitive Brazilian producer in world markets, CSN enjoys several
comparative advantages such as the low-cost of labor in Brazil, the high-grade iron
ore reserves, and the good quality of Brazil’s infrastructure (railways and ports).
CSN sells its products in local and international markets as a main raw material for
manufacturing industries, including the automotive, home appliance, packaging, con-
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struction and steel processing industries. CSN has an important regional presence,
selling steel products over 61 countries. In 2004, the three main export destinations
were North America (44%), Europe (32%) and Asia (11%).
4.3.2 Exchange rate and Interest rate exposure
CSN is exposed to exchange rate risk as a result of its business operations in
world markets. The company sells steel abroad, imports intermediate goods from
foreign markets, and holds assets and liabilities in foreign currency. Between 1997
and 2004, the company held on average 87% of its total debt in foreign currency.
Also, 20 to 25% of raw materials were imported. Raw material represented about
45% of production costs so that currency fluctuations affected approximately 10% of
its production costs. Thus, currency depreciation increased financial costs of foreign
denominated debt and operating costs due to imports of intermediate goods.
In an emerging market economy like Brazil companies are exposed not only to
currency risk but also to interest rate risk. The company’s foreign debt comes mainly
from offshore markets at a floating interest rate equal to the LIBOR rate plus a risk
premium that varies between 2 to 5 percentage points. Real-denominated debt is
indexed to floating rates such as the long term interest rate (TJLP) and short term
investments receive the CD rate.
From an accounting perspective, the impact of exchange rate fluctuations is
recorded as part of net financial income, under the item named ‘Monetary and
exchange rate gain (loss), net’ on the income statement. As seen from Table 4.2,
exchange rate losses depleted the firm’s net income and were significantly large after
the currency crisis in 1999, particularly in 2002 when the Brazilian real depreciated
52%. Exchange rate losses impact the balance sheet by reducing retained earnings
on shareholder’s equity.
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4.3.3 Exchange rate risk management policy
The company’s Treasury Department is responsible for risk management oper-
ations. All the currency exchange operations, including financing and hedging de-
cisions inside the company or with the company’s subsidiaries are approved there.
In the company’s annual report of 2003, one finds the following paragraph defining
the objectives of its risk management policy: “we use financial instruments, such as
derivatives, in order to achieve the main goals established by our Board of Direc-
tors to minimize the cost of capital and maximize the returns on financial assets,
while observing, as determined by our Board of Directors, parameters of credit and
risk. Only well-understood, conventional derivative instruments are used for these
purposes. These include futures and options traded on regulated exchanges and
‘over-the-counter’ swaps, options and forward contracts”. This statement suggests
that the company hedging objective is to minimize the cost of capital in the presence
of uncertainty about exchange rate and interest rates.
The company borrows foreign currency debt denominated mainly in dollars, yen
and euros. Table 4.3 shows the composition of foreign currency debt and the types
of financial derivatives used to hedge these positions. As can be seen from this table,
most foreign currency debt is held in U.S. dollars (80%). On the other hand, the
company has used financial derivatives, mostly cross-currency swaps, to hedge trans-
action exposure since 1999. 3 Table 4.3 also shows that in 2004, the company started
to change the composition of its currency derivatives. That year, the firm purchased
one-month dollar-real futures contracts listed at BM&F (Brazilian derivatives ex-
change market) instead of the over the counter 360-day dollar-real swap contracts
it was using before. This change in its derivative hedging program may have been
3The company used U.S. dollar/yen options and other cross-country swaps with its foreign subsidiaries between
2000 and 2002, which are not shown in the table.
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consistent with increased volatility in foreign exchange markets and the fact that the
Brazilian real could depreciate or appreciate during shorter horizons. In this situa-
tion, short-term instruments and the marking to market strategy of future contracts
could have been be preferable.
Table 4.4 measures the company’s transaction exposure to the U.S. dollar in the
way the company refers to in its reports and footnotes to financial statements. This
table shows that the company hedged part of its foreign exchange exposure using
holdings of dollar assets, which include U.S. dollar cash, U.S. dollar deposits and
government bonds indexed to the U.S. dollar in the form of treasury notes and
central bank notes.
Table 4.4 also suggests that the company reduced its exposure after 1999 and
has been engaged more actively in financial derivatives following the currency crisis.
Consistent with predictions of the model of debt composition and hedging, the com-
pany seemed to substitute away from U.S. dollar assets in favor of long positions in
swap contracts. As percentage of its dollar debt, dollar assets decreased from 36% in
1998 to 20% in 2004 while currency derivatives increased from 13% in 1998 to 66%
in 2004. Note that this measure of the extent of hedging currency exposure could
be misleading because, due to annual reporting requirements, it takes into account
derivative usage only at the end of the year, whereas hedging transactions may have
occurred at any time during the year.
In its annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission in year 2001,
the company provides more details about the features of its derivative hedging. The
report mentions that hedging operations are aimed “to match the gains from in-
vesting the proceeds of borrowing and loans with exchange losses resulting from the
devaluation of the Brazilian real against the US dollar and the Japanese yen”. Fur-
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thermore, this rather unclear statement is complemented with the following claim:
“We also manage interest costs through a balance between lower-cost floating rate
debt in foreign currency (with inherently higher risk) and more expensive, but lower
risk, fixed-rate debt in domestic currency”. 4
These two statements combined seem to suggest that the administration used
hedging operations (in particular cross currency interest rate swaps) to match the
rates of its foreign currency borrowing with the return of its short-term investments
at the market rate in Brazil (CD rate in local currency).
The previous sentence may appear contradictory at first sight. If the hedging
program’s objective is to equate the cost of its foreign currency borrowing to the CD
rate in domestic currency, then all the company would need to do is obtain loans in
domestic currency only. However, as observed in data from financing and borrowing
transactions, the company borrowed in domestic currency (only 10% of total debt
on average) at a cost usually greater than the CD rate. For example, in 2001 the
company raised domestic funds in the form of debentures at the CD rate plus 2.75%.
Importantly, the fact that the company borrowed domestically at a higher cost is
consistent with the notion that domestic credit in Brazil has been more expensive
than foreign credit, perhaps as a result of imperfections in the domestic banking
sector.
4.3.4 A concrete example
The following example, taken from the footnotes to financial statements in 2001,
illustrates this specific hedging strategy through the use of cross-currency swaps. In
the footnotes one reads “in September 2001, with a negative perspective about the
situation in Argentina and a stronger concern of further devaluation, the company en-
4This is exactly the trade off between foreign currency debt less costly but risky and domestic debt more expensive
but less risky mentioned in the analytical model of the second chapter.
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tered into swap contracts with a rate of approximately R$2.75=US$1.00 to exchange
U.S. dollar debt at a cost of approximately 7% per year with real-denominated debt
at an average rate of 19% a year”.
As of September 30, 2001 the company reported the following hedging operations:
Derivative Maturity Notional value
(Million US$)
Exchange rate hedge 11/07/2001 and 12/10/2001 70.0
Forward contracts 10/05/2001 and 09/20/2002 81.3
Currency swap 01/02/2002 100.0
In September 2001, the spot exchange rate was S(R$/US$) = 2.6713. Taking
the currency swap operation with 3-month maturity, it can be seen that indeed
the company entered into this transaction using a forward rate F (R$/US$) = 2.75,
which is consistent with the interest rates in domestic and foreign currency mentioned
above:
Domestic interest rate: i = 0.19 per annum
Foreign interest rate: i*=0.07 per annum
Spot Exchange rate: S=2.6713
Using the relationship between forward rate, spot rate and interest rates appropri-
ately quoted for a 3-month contract then,
F (R$/US$) =
S(R$/US$) ∗ (1 + i)
(1 + i∗)
=
2.6713 ∗ (1 + 0.19/4)
(1 + 0.07/4)
= 2.75
With this forward rate one concludes that markets were expecting a currency
depreciation of 2.9% in the next 3 months and of 12% in the next 12 months. In
this swap contract, the company exchanged US$ 100 million debt at 7% for R$ 275
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million debt at 19% for three months. At maturity, the company payed the bank
real-interest of R$ 13 million and received from the bank U.S. dollar-interest for US$
1.75 million (R$ 4 million) used to pay interest on its offshore U.S. dollar debt.
In addition, the company payed the bank the notional value of R$ 275 million
and received US$ 100 million. Note that at maturity, with a spot rate of S = 2.3204
the swap contract generated a loss of (2.3204 - 2.75)*100 = R$ 43 million.
In its books, the loss from the swap is recorded on the income statement as
negative financial income, which compensated for monetary and foreign exchange
gain on the U.S. debt. In this particular example, the income statement would have
the following movements in R$ million:
Financial Income -39
Gain/loss on Swap -43
Interest received in US$ 4
Financial Expense 17
Interest on Swap in R$ 13
Interest on US$ debt 4
Net Financial Income -56
Exchange rate gain/loss 43
Net Income -13
As a counterpart, gains and losses on swap contracts would be recorded on the
balance sheet as assets or liabilities, depending on whether the difference between
what the firm pays to the bank and what it receives from the bank is positive or
negative. In the example, the company recorded the loss from the swap R$ 43 as a
liability.
The previous example illustrates two points. First, in September 2001 the com-
pany was expecting a further depreciation of the real during the next three months
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and as a result decided to take a long position in swap contracts. Second, although
expectations were wrong, this swap contract fully offset the effects of currency fluc-
tuations. 5 Losses associated with the hedging contract were fully compensated by
the exchange rate gain so that company earnings reflect only interest payments on
debt (R$ 13 million). Of course, had the company been unhedged it would have
obtained a positive net income of R$ 39 million, resulting from financial expenses of
R$ 4 million on its U.S. dollar debt and exchange rate gains of R$ 43 million.
A closer evaluation of the company’s hedging operations indicates that the swap
loss associated with the strength of the real in the last quarter of 2001 also offset the
initial gain in other short term contracts the company entered in previous months.
These contracts expired before the end of the year. As of December 31, the stock
of swap contracts was only US$ 100 million, compared to US$ 1056 million in year
2000.
It is worth mentioning that although these hedging transactions are intended to
minimize the exchange rate risk, they are not at free-cost due to the counterparty
credit risk. In its annual reports, the company says they manage credit risk exposure
by restricting the counterparties on derivatives to major financial institutions with
high credit quality.
Cross currency swaps have been actively used in more recent years. During 2002,
a year of large exchange rate volatility, swap operations had a positive impact of R$
760 million that partly offset the exchange rate losses caused by the 52% currency
depreciation. The appreciation of the real in 2002 and 2003 caused losses in hedging
operations. These losses were partly compensated with foreign exchange gains in the
5The report mentions that derivatives are used for hedging purposes and not for speculative reasons because
the risk exposure created by financial derivatives is fully offset by the opposite exposure arising from the liability
being hedged. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence by Brown (2001) for a US multinational company. Brown
argues that hedging operations require identification of an underlying foreign currency exposure before a derivative
is entered to, which from an accounting perspective, can not be viewed as speculative trading.
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income statement as shown in Table 4.5.
In addition to the current information from the company’s income statement,
Table 4.5 presents a counterfactual exercise. It shows the company’s pre-tax income
in the absence of the derivative hedging program. It is clear from the table that the
variation of pre-tax income and net income would have been greater had the company
not entered the swap contracts. Pre-tax income volatility during the 4 years shown
in the table, measured by the standard deviation, is R$ 1515 million with the swap
contract whereas it is R$ 1998 if no swap contracts were used. As a result, in the
absence of hedging the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on shareholder’s equity
would have been also significant. Therefore, as suggested by theory, hedging helped
the company smooth its earnings and reduce the volatility of the market value of its
equity.
4.3.5 Evaluation of the Company’s hedging strategy
Evaluation of the effectiveness of hedging strategies is a hard task when done in
isolation or for individual companies because the benchmark for comparison is diffi-
cult to set up. Is the hedging strategy effective with respect to what? The approach
used in this section emphasizes how effective hedging is to reduce transaction expo-
sure, to contribute to earnings smoothing, to increase foreign currency capacity and
to help the company meet its investment plans.
Before 1999, during the fixed exchange rate regime, CSN had no incentives to
hedge using financial derivatives since there was no currency exposure. Revenues
from exports (20% of total revenues) in U.S. dollars and holdings of U.S. dollar assets
seemed to be adequate hedges to deal with any possibility of currency depreciation.
This strategy appeared to work fine, helping the company survive the effects of the
currency crisis in 1999.
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As a measure of economic exposure, it is interesting to observe that the firm’s
gross margin increased from 35% during the fixed exchange rate regime to 45% in
the floating exchange regime (between 2000 and 2004). On average, the company
had a gross margin ratio of 42%, significantly greater than the 29% of the companies
operating in the steel industry in Brazil. Consistent with the model’s predictions,
net exports seemed to act as a natural hedge during periods of currency depreciation
allowing the company increase its gross margin. Furthermore, it can be seen that re-
turns from productive investment were larger than returns from financial investment
(the CD rate never exceeded 20% while Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreci-
ation and Amortization (EBITDA) as a fraction of revenues was 32% on average),
which is also consistent with the model assumptions.
As suggested by Table 4.4, the company reduced its transaction exposure by par-
ticipating more actively in financial derivatives and substituting away from invest-
ment in foreign assets. As a percentage of net debt, transaction exposure dropped
from 80% in 1999 to less than 20% in 2004. In addition, as seen from Table 4.5,
proceeds from hedging operations partly offset exchange rate losses that otherwise
would have further depleted shareholder’s equity. Regarding the firm’s debt capacity,
the company has remained highly leveraged. Total debt represented approximately
41% of its total assets, a figure significantly greater than that of the rest of firms
in its sector (24%). Even during the periods of large exchange rate volatility, the
company managed to obtain dollar loans from international markets and to keep its
ratio of foreign debt to total debt equal to 90% on average, above the 53% of firms
in its sector.
The firm was also able to undertake its investment programs. As part of its
expansion and modernization plans, in 1997 CSN acquired Companhia Vale do Rio
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Doce, an important steel complex in Brazil. This operation required an investment of
R$ 1195 million and was funded almost entirely with foreign currency borrowing at a
cost equal to LIBOR plus 3.2%, approximately 8.9% per year. As shown in Table 4.6,
even during years of high volatility in foreign exchange markets, the company was
able to maintain its capital expenditures. Between 1998 and 2004 capital expenditure
represented 10% of fixed assets.
Regarding specific investment plans, the company managed to execute planned
investment programs even during times of high exchange rate volatility. For example,
in 2000 the company had plans to invest US$ 320 million in the Technology Upgrade
program during 2001. In 2001, the company invested US$ 275 million (86% of its
planned investment). In 2001, CSN had plans to execute US$ 80 million in the
same program during 2002 and ended up investing US$ 174, more than doubled the
planned investment. By the end of 2004, the company announced an ambitious plan
for different investment projects up to US$ 820 million to be made through 2007.
Out of this amount, it invested US$ 340 million in 2004.
In summary, the overall evidence seems to show that hedging activities helped
mitigate the effect of exchange rate on the company’s earnings and shareholder’s
equity. With smoothed earnings the company seemed to be able to generate internal
funds and borrowed cheaper funds from foreign capital markets to finance investment
plans and grow over time.
4.4 Case Study in Votorantim Celulose e Papel
Votorantim Celulose e Papel S.A. (VCP) is one of the leading pulp and paper
corporations in Brazil. The company is part of the Votorantim Group, one of the
largest industrial investors in Latin America, headquartered in São Paulo. The
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company’s production process is fully integrated, starting from wood production at
its own eucalyptus forests to its two main pulp and paper mills in Jacarei and Luiz
Antonio, and two facilities exclusively devoted to paper production in Piracicaba and
Mogi da Cruzes, all of them located in São Paulo.
VCP started operations in 1988 when the Votorantim Group bought Celpav Celu-
lose a Paper, an important pulp and paper maker in São Paulo. During the 1990s the
company has expanded operations, acquiring and merging with local paper makers.
In 2001, VCP purchased 28% of voting shares of Aracruz Celulose S.A., a leading
paper maker and exporter in Brazil. More recently, in 2004 VCP signed a venture
agreement with Suzano Bahia Sul Papel and Celulose S.A. to acquire Ripasa S.A.,
another important paper and pulp producer in the country.
4.4.1 Market Share, customers, competitors and Exports
Votorantim is one of the largest pulp and paper companies and the leading pro-
ducer of wood-free printing and writing papers in Brazil. As an integrated pulp
and paper producer selling goods worldwide, the company faces a highly competi-
tive market, comprising a large number of integrated and sophisticated producers.
In 2004 the company sold 61% of its pulp production and used the remainder to
manufacture a wide range of printing and writing paper products, including coated
and uncoated printing and writing papers, thermal papers and carbonless papers.
In 2004 approximately 91% of its market pulp and 30% of its paper products
were exported. Exports accounted for 49% of the company’s revenues. As seen from
Table 4.7 foreign sales of its market pulp were shipped mainly to European and Asian
countries while its paper products were mostly sold in North America.
Thanks to its very particular geography with vast woods and forests, Brazil has a
natural comparative advantage in forestry, which makes it one of the world’s lowest-
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cost producers of pulp. Furthermore, Brazilian eucalyptus is one of the finest pulping
trees species which has evolved more rapidly over recent years, resulting in a signifi-
cant improvement in its productivity. As a consequence, Brazil has developed a well
diversified and modern industry in both domestic and foreign markets. Brazil is the
eleventh largest paper producer and the sixth pulp producer in the world.
In the Brazilian market, VCP is one of the five largest makers of pulp and paper.
Other important competitors include Lwarcel Celulose e Papel S.A., Suzano Bahia
Sul, Riocell S.A. and Klabin S.A. As reported in Table 4.8, the pulp and paper
industry in Brazil has shown a steady growth in recent years. VCP pulp and paper
production is counted among the five top producers and in 2004 it represented 11%
of domestic production (mainly in pulp production with a 14% market share).
4.4.2 Exchange rate and Interest rate exposure
Due to its international business VCP is exposed to various market risks, includ-
ing changes in foreign exchange rates and interest rates. The company is exposed
to exchange rate risk because a significant portion of its revenues and assets are
denominated in local currency while it holds a large fraction of its debt in foreign
currency. From 1997 to 2004 the company held on average 84% of its total debt
in foreign currency debt. Exports represented on average 34% of its revenues. The
foreign currency-denominated component of its paper costs did not exceed 10% of
total costs, and were mainly covered with revenues from exports. Then, currency
depreciation mostly affected non-operating income, in particular, financial costs due
to foreign debt and exchange rate losses resulting from the difference between assets
and liabilities in foreign currency.
Almost all of the company’s foreign debt is denominated in dollars, which the
company borrows from offshore markets at the LIBOR rate plus a margin between 1
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and 4 percentage points. Therefore, interest rate risk primarily comes from variations
in floating rates such as LIBOR and the long term domestic rate TJLP. Returns on
cash holdings and held-to-maturity investment denominated in reals are based on
the CD rate, also a floating rate. As seen from Table 4.9, the line “Monetary and
exchange rate loss, net” shows that exchange rate variations caused losses of R$ 75
million in 2001 and R$ 90 million in 2002 after currency deprecation of 19% and 52%
respectively. Compared to Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, exchange rate losses
were smaller and seemed to indicate that Votorantim was able to better absorb the
impact of the devaluation of the real. These net losses or gains were partially offset
by the net financial income (or expense) resulting from the gain (or loss) on hedging
operations.
4.4.3 Company’s risk management
Financial decisions, including borrowing and hedging operations are made by
the company’s Treasury department. This department establishes internal policies
about currency exposure positions and revises these policies from time to time in
response to new information on the macroeconomic environment. To manage its risk
exposure the company invests part of its funds in dollar assets and also uses financial
derivatives as a general financial strategy designed to optimize market opportunities.
The company describes its hedging strategy as follows: “hedge contracts mitigate
these risks by committing the counterparties and ourselves to positions in foreign
currency, thereby offsetting, to the extent of these contracts, the effects of currency
fluctuations on our foreign currency debts. The management of our net exposure
position takes into account a number of current and projected economic factors and
market conditions”.
Regarding its hedging programs, like Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, Votoran-
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tim enters into cross currency interest rate swap agreements exchanging foreign cur-
rency debt with local currency debt at a given exchange rate. By exchanging interest
payments, that is, paying real-interest (e.g. the CD rate) and receiving dollar-interest
(e.g. LIBOR plus spread) the company protects itself from unfavorable exchange rate
movements. Table 4.10 shows the company’s exposure to the US dollar as reported
on footnotes to financial statements. As can be seen, the company also counts on
the mix of cross-currency interest rate swaps and investment in dollar assets (mainly
Brazilian government bonds indexed to the U.S. dollar). As in the case of CSN,
exposure is measured before revenues from exports though VCP usually refers to its
transaction exposure in terms of the number of months of exports required to fully
cover it.
Noticeably, the company uses significant amounts of dollar assets to hedge its
dollar debt. Dollar assets have been on average about 40% of dollar debt. As Table
4.10 suggests, the company reduced its exposure after the currency crisis in 1999.
That year, transaction exposure was negative, indicating that the company was over-
hedged in US$ 61 million. In the next years, exposure represented on average less
than 4 months of export revenues.
Unlike Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, Votorantim uses cross currency swaps
as the only type of derivative to hedge its dollar debt. Table 4.11 shows the notional
amounts and other specific characteristics of outstanding cross currency swaps.
Spreads between domestic and foreign interest rates, assuming no arbitrage oppor-
tunities, seem to indicate that markets were expecting the Brazilian real to depreciate
during each year between 2001 and 2004 as shown in the table. Therefore, the later
appreciation of the currency in 2003 and 2004 was not anticipated by the market
and could have taken by surprise many companies holding long positions in financial
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derivatives (as happened to both Votorantim and Siderurgica Nacional).
Regarding the effect of hedging on the company’s financial and net income, Table
4.12 shows that the company obtained gains from its swaps of R$ 32 and R$ 26
million in years of currency depreciation, 2001 and 2002 respectively. These gains
partly compensated the exchange rate losses of R$ 75 and R$ 90 millions respectively.
In years 2003 and 2004, when the real appreciated against the US dollar, net proceeds
from swap contracts were negative and equivalent to R$ 84 and R$ 26 million. These
losses were compensated with exchange rate gains of R$ 25 and R$ 190 million
respectively. 6
Unlike Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, gains and losses from swap contracts are
a small fraction of net income. However, as seen from table 4.12, hedging operations
reduced pre-tax income volatility. The standard deviation of pre-tax income when
swap contracts were used was R$ 347 million between 2001 and 2004; it would have
been R$ 393 million in the absence of hedging, using again the counterfactual exercise.
Therefore, although not as much as in the case of CSN, hedging operations helped
Votorantim smooth its earnings and mitigate the effect of exchange rate movements
on shareholder’s equity.
4.4.4 Evaluation of the Company’s hedging strategy
Unlike Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, Votorantim was involved in hedging op-
erations with financial derivatives during the fixed exchange rate period in Brazil.
A possible explanation for this behavior is that the company had expectations of
currency depreciation, most likely as a result of financial crises in Asia in 1997 and
6A common accounting practice is not to book the exchange of notional amounts at maturity, but the net loss
or gain as an asset or liability. Booking of these transactions within the income statement varies across companies.
CSN records the gains from swap contracts as part of net financial income and monetary and exchange rate losses in
a separate account within other non-operating income. VCP records net monetary and exchange rate gains together
with proceeds from swaps as net financial income.
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Russia in 1998 that hit the Brazilian economy causing large capital outflows and
credit contraction. It is worth mentioning, however, that these specific derivative
transactions seem to have been used in reality to take advantage of arbitrage oppor-
tunities in foreign exchange markets. As the company mentioned in its annual report
to the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2001, “like many other Brazilian
exporters, the company has access to dollar-denominated sources of long-term fi-
nancing in the form of export pre-payments or credits. (Arbitrage) Opportunities
arise between the lower interest rates paid on the U.S. dollar-denominated export
credit and borrowing, the proceeds of which are invested in real-denominated cash,
cash equivalents and held-to-maturity investments, which provide higher yields”. 7
Regarding the company’s gross profits, between 1997 and 2004, VCP had an
average gross margin ratio of 42%, greater than the 38% of companies in the pulp
and paper industry in Brazil. Moreover, the company increased its gross profits
during the floating exchange rate period (48%). This was the result of not only the
positive effect of currency depreciation on its foreign sales between 1999 and 2002
but also the increase in volume exported.
During years when the real appreciated against the U.S. dollar, the company
experienced a significant increase in export revenues, 97% and 27% in 2003 and 2004
respectively. Thanks to its investment plans, the company was able to increase the
volume of its sales to foreign markets in 82% in 2003 and 35% in 2004, which more
than offset the negative valuation effect brought by the currency appreciation. It
seems clear that net exports worked as a natural hedge for the company.
Votorantim main sources of liquidity are cash generated from operations and
short-term and long-term borrowing. Internal operating funds, measured through
7It is not clear though, why other companies did not take advantage of this situation. Possible explanations in
favor of arbitrage opportunities available for only few companies include information asymmetries, transaction costs
or limited access to foreign capital markets due to different investor’s risk perception across companies.
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the ratio of EBITDA to total revenues was on average 42%, greater than the ratio
of firms in the paper industry in Brazil (36%). Borrowed funds represented approx-
imately 38% of its total assets, a greater ratio compared to that in its sector (34%).
These sources of funds helped the firm keep its capital expenditures. As seen from
Table 4.13 VCP was able to increase its capital expenditures consistent with invest-
ment plans even during years of high volatility in exchange rate markets. Capital
expenditure between 1998 and 2004 represented, on average, 16% of the company’s
fixed assets.
Regarding specific investment plans,VCP was able to execute most of its planned
investment programs. For example, in 2003 the company completed the expansion of
its Jacarei plant with a total spending of US$ 483 million out of an initial investment
plan of US$ 495 million. Even during 2002, a difficult year for the Brazilian economy,
the company executed investment projects for US$ 317 million (73% of the planned
investment for that year). In 2003 the company invested US$ 183 (83% of its planned
investment). These investments helped the company’s business grow significantly in
2003 and 2004.
As a result of the culmination of the Jacarei plant expansion the company in-
creased its annual pulp production capacity by 67% (from 850,000 tons per year in
2002 to 1.4 million tons per year in 2004). The additional pulp production was sold
primarily in foreign markets, which explains the extraordinary increase in exports
during 2003 and 2004.
Overall, as in the previous case of Companhia Siderurgica Nacional, it seems that
hedging strategies helped Votorantim mitigate the effects of foreign exchange fluc-
tuations on its profits, reducing the volatility of its net income. Smoothed earnings
and increased equity definitely contributed to have a better risk profile to the eyes
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of foreign investors, which have been providing relatively cheap credit to finance the
company’s expansion during times of economic downturn. As a result, VCP has been
able to increase its foreign debt from 79% during the fixed exchange rate period to
85% after the currency crisis in 1999; and has continued making capital expenditures
that, on average, represent 16% of its fixed assets.
4.5 Conclusion
By conducting a close examination of footnotes to financial statements, annual
reports to the senior administration and reports to the US Securities and Exchange
Commission available through the Brazilian stock market (BOVESPA) and firms’
web sites, this chapter studies actual hedging strategies implemented by Brazilian
companies. Two large corporations, both operating in international markets and
using financial hedging, are chosen to illustrate how corporations deal with exchange
rate risk. Even though the case study finds that there are no general rules for setting
an optimal hedging strategy, it can be concluded that the firm behavior observed
in practice is consistent with the model of optimal debt composition and hedging of
the first chapter and with theoretical arguments suggested by the corporate hedging
literature.
The drastic change in exchange rate policy in Brazil exposed firms to a large degree
of currency risk because at the time of the crisis they were heavily indebted in foreign
currency. Both firms had about 85% of their debt denominated in foreign currency.
In this scenario, both firms seemed to choose hedging operations effectively, which
translated into good financial performance even during periods of high volatility in
foreign exchange markets.
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional and Votorantim Celulose e Papel obtain a sig-
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nificant amount of revenues from foreign sales. In both cases, operating profits are
practically unaffected by currency devaluation since export revenues more than offset
the costs of imported goods. Therefore, the main impact of exchange rate movements
affect the companies’ profits by reducing financial income, and this is precisely where
derivative hedging appears to work effectively. Both companies use cross-currency
interest rate swaps to compensate for the impact of exchange rate losses, recorded
in the income statement according to Brazilian corporate laws.
Consistent with theory, hedging contributes to smooth the companies’ earnings
and help mitigate depletion of shareholder’s equity. In turn, this contributes to
reduce investor’s risk perception about the firm and to increase its access to foreign
capital markets. Even though it is hard to establish a direct impact of hedging on
the firm’s financial performance by studying individual companies, at least one can
conclude that hedging may contribute to keep the firm’s business growing by allowing
it to obtain the necessary funding to meet its investment plans. It would be hard
as well to imagine that these two companies could have enjoyed a good financial
position in the absence of hedging strategies.
There are too many factors involved in the firm risk management policy and having
a full understanding of all these possible factors is beyond the scope of the case study.
There are still many unresolved questions about the hedging process of companies
in Brazil. For example, issues such as the right motivations to use a particular type
of derivative instrument or whether the extent of hedging is optimal have not been
addressed and may serve as motivation for further studies. However, by studying a
particular aspect of risk management activities of corporations, such as transactional
exposure management, the case studies find that firm behavior regarding borrowing
and hedging is broadly consistent with what the corporate finance theory suggests.
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Table 4.1: Brazil: Main Steel Producers
2003 2004
Company Ranking Production Ranking Production
(Million of Tons) (Million of Tons)
Gerdau SA 1 7.0 1 7.3
CSN 2 5.3 2 5.5
Siderurgica Tubarao 3 4.8 3 5.0
Usiminas 4 4.5 4 4.7
Belgo Mineira 5 4.1 5 4.2
Others 2.5 2.9
Total 31.1 32.9
Source: Annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 4.2: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional: Main Performance Indicators
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Operations (Thousands of Tons)
Production 4.793 4.705 4.846 4.782 4.048 5.107 5.318 5.518
Sales 4.538 4.064 4.545 4.311 4.045 4.97 5.000 4.744
Financial Data (Thousand of million of R$)
Revenues 3034 3155 3537 4264 4832 6108 8292 12251
Domestic Sales 2478 2640 2834 3665 4252 4532 5940 9260
Foreign Sales 1/ 556 515 703 599 580 1576 2352 2991
Net Revenue 2579 2658 2936 3472 3982 5165 6977 9800
Gross Profit 904 948 1157 1375 1702 2417 3140 4802
EBITDA 816 857 1441 1330 1698 2276 3002 4789
Operating Profit 567 551 749 938 1273 1730 2312 3951
Net Financial Income -366 -116 -764 35 -975 -2525 -1234 -1146
Monetary and ER gain (loss), net -98 -131 -219 -398 -396 -2904 782 229
Net Income 457 435 197 602 300 -195 1031 1982
Total Assets 8729 8484 12503 15281 13433 15434 22522 24705
Total Debt 3649 3378 4563 5158 5571 6786 8957 8470
Domestic debt 382 261 224 226 242 1275 2019 1712
Foreign debt 3267 3117 4339 4932 5329 5511 6938 6758
Shareholder’s Equity 4389 4555 5852 5704 5118 4895 7419 6655
Financial Ratios (percent)
GrossProfit/NetRevenue 35.0 35.6 39.4 39.6 42.7 46.8 45.0 49.0
EBITDA/NetRevenue 31.6 32.2 49.1 38.3 42.6 44.1 43.0 48.9
NetIncome/NetRevenue 17.7 16.4 6.7 17.3 7.5 -3.8 14.8 20.2
CurrentAsset/CurrentLiabilities 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.4
ForeignDebt/TotalDebt 89.5 92.3 95.1 95.6 95.6 81.2 77.5 79.8
TotalDebt/TotalAsset 41.8 39.8 36.5 33.8 41.5 44.0 39.8 34.3
1/ Exports from Brazil and Sales from foreign subsidiaries.
Net Financial income includes Monetary and Exchange Rate loss or gain.
EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization.
Source: Company’s annual report, various years.
113
Table 4.3: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional: Foreign Currency Debt and Derivatives (US$ million)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Foreign Currency Debt 2927 2579 2425 2522 2297 1560 2401 2546
Short Term 1456 798 1428 1033 1147 806 748 584
Long Term 1471 1781 997 1489 1150 754 1653 1962
Debt Composition
U.S. Dollar 2825 2460 2231 2318 2086 1427 2229 1587
Yen 93 20 153 150 156 78 72 874
Other 9 99 41 54 55 55 100 85
Currency Derivatives 0 0 290 1056 100 791 1286 1047
Swaps 0 0 290 0 100 786 1286 31
Options 0 0 0 770 0 0 0 0
Forward 0 0 0 286 0 5 0 0
Futures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1016
Source: Footnotes to the company’s financial statements.
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Table 4.4: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional: Transaction Exposure to the U.S. Dollar (US$ million)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
US Dollar Debt 2825 2460 2231 2318 2086 1427 2229 1587
US Dollar Assets 600 930 799 581 194 227 441 317
Net Debt 2225 1530 1431 1737 1892 1200 1788 1270
Dollar derivatives 0 0 290 1056 100 791 1286 1047
Transaction Exposure 2225 1530 1141 681 1792 409 502 223
Exposure/Dollar debt (%) 79 62 51 29 86 29 23 14
Dollar Asset/Dollar Debt (%) 21 38 36 25 9 16 20 20
Dollar Derivative/Dollar Debt (%) 0 0 13 46 5 55 58 66
Source: Footnotes to the company’s financial statements.
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Table 4.5: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional: Effect of Currency Swaps on Income Statement
2001 2002 2003 2004
Operating Profit 1273 1730 2312 3951
(+)Financial Income 117 1333 -786 -38
Swap contracts 0 760 -841 -229
Other 117 573 55 191
(-)Financial Expenses 482 667 250 884
(+)Net Non Operational Income -611 -3191 -198 -224
Monetary and ER loss -396 -2904 782 229
Other -215 -287 -980 -453
Pre-Tax Income
With Swap 297 -795 1078 2805
Without Swap 297 -1555 1919 3034
Source: Footnotes to the company’s financial statements.
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Table 4.6: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional: Capital Expenditure (US$ Million)









Source: Annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 4.7: Votorantim Celulose e Papel: Exports of Pulp and Paper by destination in 2004
Pulp Paper
Destination Thousand Tons (%) Thousand Tons (%)
North America 85.544 11.2 62.726 34.9
Latin America 3.044 0.4 43.756 24.4
Europe 347.371 45.4 53.889 30.0
Asia and Africa 328.404 43.0 19.158 10.7
Total 764.363 100 179.529 100
Source: Annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 4.8: Brazil: Pulp and Paper Production (Thousands of Tons)
2004 2003 2002
Pulp Production
Brazil 9620 9104 8012
VCP 1347 1166 823
Paper Production
Brazil 8452 7811 7661
VCP 661 673 571
Total Pulp and Paper production
Brazil 18073 16915 15673
Top five domestic producers 10978 10547 9811
VCP 2008 1839 1394
Source: Annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 4.9: Votorantim Celulose e Papel: Main Performance Indicators
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Operations (Thousands of Tons)
Sales 680 747 825 870 912 906 1175 1459
Domestic market 389 396 454 525 522 521 477 515
Foreign market 291 351 371 345 390 385 698 944
Financial Data (Thousand of million of R$)
Revenues 777 823 1264 1618 1736 2317 3240 3773
Domestic Sales 547 576 854 1183 1249 1576 1782 1924
Foreign Sales 1/ 230 247 410 435 487 741 1458 1849
Net Revenues 684 731 1123 1437 1554 2061 2926 3403
Gross Profit 171 186 487 729 720 966 1446 1671
EBITDA 171 195 480 756 707 940 1387 1613
Operating Profit 48 57 323 568 510 685 1067 1169
Net Financial Income -9 -41 -120 -106 36 -97 -76 -136
Monetary and ER gain (loss), net 0 0 -56 n.d. -75 -90 25 190
Net Income 17 -7 161 394 376 283 853 790
Total Asset 2929 3049 3289 3487 5259 7345 7949 7650
Total Debt 889 1045 1075 887 2259 3803 3679 2834
Domestic debt 192 200 163 116 217 534 602 554
Foreign debt 697 845 912 771 2042 3269 3077 2281
Shareholder’s Equity 1894 1855 1985 2318 2602 2796 3415 3917
Ratios (percent)
GrossProfit/NetRevenue 24.9 25.5 43.4 50.7 46.3 46.8 49.4 49.1
EBIDTA/NetRevenue 25.0 26.7 42.8 52.6 45.5 45.6 47.4 47.4
NetIncome/NetRevenue 2.5 -1.0 14.4 27.4 24.2 13.7 29.1 23.2
CurrentAsset/CurrentLiabilities 2.8 3.4 3.1 3.6 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1
ForeignDebt/TotalDebt 78.4 80.8 84.9 86.9 90.4 86.0 83.6 80.5
TotalDebt/TotalAsset 30.3 34.3 32.7 25.4 42.9 51.8 46.3 37.0
1/ Exports from Brazil and Sales from foreign subsidiaries.
Net Financial income includes Monetary and Exchange Rate loss or gain.
EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization.
Source: Company’s annual report, various years.
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Table 4.10: Votorantim Celulose e Papel: Transaction Exposure to the U.S. Dollar (US$ million)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
US Dollar Debt 624 699 510 394 516 545 796 780
US Dollar Assets 91 88 317 108 282 362 308 275
Net Debt 534 611 193 287 233 183 488 505
Dollar derivatives 328 500 254 198 233 155 214 259
Transaction Exposure 206 110 -61 89 0 28 274 246
Export revenues 206 204 229 222 210 210 505 696
Months of exports needed 12 6 0 5 0 2 7 4
Exposure/Dollar debt (%) 33 16 -12 23 0 5 34 32
Dollar Asset/Dollar Debt (%) 15 13 62 27 55 66 39 35
Dollar Derivative/Dollar Debt (%) 52 72 50 50 45 28 27 33
Source: Footnotes to the company’s financial statements.
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Table 4.11: Votorantim Celulose e Papel: Cross Currency Swap contracts
Year Notional Value Notional Value Average Maturity Paid interest Received interest
R$ million US$ million R$(%) US$ (%)
2001 541 233 17.43 13.1
2002 548 155 2003-2008 19.05 13.3
2003 618 214 2006-2008 23.27 13.3
2004 687 259 2007-2008 16.17 11.3
Source: Footnotes to the company’s financial statements.
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Table 4.12: Votorantim Celulose e Papel: Effect of Currency Swaps on Income Statement
2001 2002 2003 2004
Operating Profit 510 685 1067 1169
(+)Financial Income 198 217 153 92
Swap contracts 32 26 -84 -26
Other 166 191 237 118
(-)Financial Expenses 86 224 254 228
(+)Net Non Operational Income -118 -299 17 48
Monetary and ER loss -75 -90 25 190
Other -42 -209 -8 -141
Pre-Tax Income
With Swap 504 379 983 1081
Without Swap 472 353 1067 1108
Note: financial income and expenses have been modified to reflect swap income and exchange rate losses
Source: Footnotes to the company’s financial statements.
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Table 4.13: Votorantim Celulose e Papel: Capital Expenditure (US$ Million)









Source: Annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This dissertation combines theoretical and empirical work to examine how finan-
cial markets and exchange rate regimes affect companies decisions about borrowing
and hedging. Financial data for a sample of non-financial firms in Brazil over the
period 1996 to 2004 is used to illustrate why the collapse of the fixed exchange rate
regime, in early 1999, did not cause major changes in the currency composition of
debt. According to the theory, this fact was the result of firms that, in anticipation
to the currency devaluation, decided to hedge their currency risk. Since derivative
hedging was available in Brazil at the time of the crisis, companies were able to
use derivative hedging to maintain and even increase their borrowing in foreign cur-
rency. Empirical work using these data finds that, in the presence of foreign exchange
risk, derivative hedging becomes important to increase firm’s debt capacity and adds
considerable value to a firm by smoothing financing and operating policies. When
exposed to currency shocks, companies try also alternative hedging strategies such as
revenues from net exports acting as a natural hedge and holdings of assets in foreign
currency, which provide financial income to compensate for increased interests in
foreign currency and to mitigate the depletion of shareholder’s equity. As derivative






Chapter II: Model Solution
A.1 Determination of Equilibrium
There are four possible cases in the profit maximization problem of a representa-
tive firm. The maximized objective function is different depending on:
i. 1H = 1 and 1L = 1 if the firm is solvent in both states
ii. 1H = 1 and 1L = 0 if the firm is solvent only in state H
iii. 1H = 0 and 1L = 1 if the firm is solvent only in state L
iv. 1H = 0 and 1L = 0 if the firm is insolvent in both states
Case (iv) is the uninteresting case and is ruled out because no lender will lend
the firm any amount so that it cannot undertake the project. Moreover, given the
features of the hedging contracts, firms being solvent only in one state of the exchange
rate are firms that choose h = 0. Therefore, expected profits for the remaining three
cases are respectively:
i. E[ΠTOT ] = PG[R−Rm − F Ru − φ|h|]
ii. E[ΠTOT ] = PG[q(R−Rm − sH Ru)]
iii. E[ΠTOT ] = PG[(1− q)(R−Rm − sL Ru)]
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Case (ii) is also ruled out because it is always dominated by case (i). To see this,
note that when φ = 0 for any 0 < q < 1 then sH > F and profits are greater in
case (i) than in case (ii). When φ > 0 then the only possibility for profits in case
(ii) to exceed profits in case (i) would be if both q and φ are large enough. However,
these values would imply q > q and φ > φ which would make h = 0, in which case
profits in case (ii) are again smaller. Intuitively, when the firm is solvent in state H
only, it is also solvent in both states H and L even without hedging. Moreover, with
positive transaction costs there is no reason to hedge a positive amount when the
firm is already solvent in state H.1 Therefore, the relevant cases to evaluate are only
(i) and (iii), which means that in equilibrium, the firm is always solvent in state L
(1L = 1) and case (iii) of insolvency in state H happens only when the firm is not
hedged at all.
Given that the firm is the residual claimant in debt contracts, it is straight forward
to see that constraints (5) through (7) will be binding. This is so because to maxi-
mize profits the firm chooses the minimum payments that make its creditors willing
to participate financing the project. A representative firm solves its maximization
problem at date 0 using the following algorithm:
i. Suppose that given the lower cost of foreign debt the firm decides to borrow di-
rectly from foreign banks (1m = 0). Furthermore, suppose the firm judges itself
as financially solvent without hedging (1H = 1, 1L = 1 and h = 0). Conditions
(5) and (6) jointly determine Im = 0 and Rm = 0. Given A and I, the firm finds
Iu using (1), which holds with equality, and then Ru is determined by (7). With
expected payments Rm and Ru already pinned down, constraint (3) is used to
1The only possibility for a firm to hedge if solvent in state H is if it holds negative hedging or sells forward
contracts. However, for any positive transaction cost φ, negative hedging is also dominated by zero hedging.
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verify if the firm is solvent in state H.2 If it is, then the firm can in fact borrow
directly from foreign markets without hedging.
ii. When the firm is not solvent in state H and decides not to hedge then foreign
creditors adjust their expected payment. Ru depends on q and is bigger to
compensate for the possibility of default. Constraint (8) is binding so that
Rf (sH) = 0 (e.g. the residual value of the firm goes to pay for bankruptcy
costs if state H occurs). Constraint (2) gives the firm’s own payment Rf (sL).
If constraint (4) is met then borrowing in foreign currency without hedging is
feasible. Otherwise, the firm could still borrow directly from foreign markets
but must use forward contracts to reduce the possibility of default in state H.
iii. If the firm hedges its foreign exchange risk via currency forwards then (2) and
(3) combined with (8) and (9) determine an optimal range for hedging [h, h]
given by:
sHRu +Rm −R
sH − F − φ
≤ h ≤ R−Rm − sLRu
F − sL + φ
Profit maximization implies that for any positive and small φ the firm chooses
the minimum level to avoid default so that optimal hedging is h = h with
Rm = 0. As a result, constraint (8) is binding and Rf (sH) = 0. Note that when
φ = 0 there are multiple solutions for the optimal hedge because the firm is
indifferent choosing any value within the range [h, h]. If constraint (4) is met
then borrowing in foreign currency and hedging is feasible. The firm determines
whether hedging is optimal or not by comparing profits with the not hedging
2Two cases of solvency in state H are considered. First, the firm is solvent if it receives the maximum expected
payment in state H, that is Rf (sH) = B/∆p, even after paying its creditors (constraints (8) and (9) are both non-
binding). A less stringent second criterion for solvency is when the firm at least guarantees repayment in state H
even though it is left with nothing so that Rf (sH) = 0 (constraint (8) is binding but constraint (9) is not binding).
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case. If constraint (4) is not met then the firm cannot borrow directly from
foreign markets and must turn to domestic banks first.
iv. Suppose the firm borrows from domestic banks (1m = 1) and believes it is
financially solvent without hedging (1H = 1, 1L = 1 and h = 0). As before,












Notice that when the firm is solvent in state H, Rm does not depend on q. Given
I and A, and having determined Im then: if A+ Im > I then resource constraint (1)
is not binding, the firm borrows in domestic currency only and invests excess funds
I − A− Im at the market rate rf . If A + Im ≤ I then constraint (1) is binding and
the firm uses it to determine Iu so that the currency composition of debt is pinned
down. As in steps (ii) and (iii) of this algorithm, the firm can borrow now in both
currencies without hedging if it is solvent in state H or can face higher payments
if it is not solvent in state H and does not hedge. Whether the firm must hedge
or not depends on exogenous parameters (in particular q and φ). The firm solves
for its optimal hedging decision by comparing profits in each case. If the firm must
hedge the optimal range for hedging is [h, h] with Rm > 0. As before, the minimum
level h = h is chosen when φ > 0 or any level within [h, h] when φ = 0. Finally, if
constraint (4) is not met even with a positive level of hedging then the firm is poorly
capitalized (too small net worth) and will not be able to borrow at all.
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A.2 Determination of the firm’s minimum net worth requirements in
equilibrium
To find the minimum net worth requirements under different hedging strategies
suppose that instead of using its initial assets as an exogenous variable, the en-
trepreneur wants to determine the size of A necessary to maximize expected profits
and meet all the constraints. Net worth A can then be treated as an additional en-
dogenous variable that the entrepreneur finds in equilibrium and compare with her
initial assets, renamed as A0, to determine for example if the firm is solvent without
hedging, or if the firm needs to borrow form local banks and be hedged.
1. The firm borrows a mixture of domestic and foreign currency debt (1m = 1) so
that constraint (1) is binding. There are four different cases:
a. The firm is solvent in both states only if hedged (1H = 1 and 1L = 1). There
are 9 constraints to solve for 8 unknowns (h, Im, Iu, Rm, Ru, Rf (sL), Rf (sH), A)
so that one constraint is non-binding. Constraints (2) and (3) combined
with (8) and (9) defines the range [h, h] for optimal hedging h and for
any positive and small transaction cost φ, the firm chooses h = h. This
condition is equivalent to have constraint (8) binding and (9) non-binding.
Therefore, the firm hedges enough to avoid default and it gets zero cash
flow in the devaluation state. Having constraints (1) through (8) holding











































(1− q)(sH − sL)
]
The minimum A required by foreign banks is:
AH(r














∆p(1− q)(sH − sL)
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b. The firm is solvent in both states even if it is not hedged: (1H = 1, 1L = 1
and h = 0). This situation requires higher net worth A. The first criterion
for solvency is that the firm is at least able to pay its debt even if it has
to give up its own expected payment during the depreciation state, that
is Rf (sH) = 0. A firm will be able to invest if in return it expects to get
higher payments during the non-depreciation state. Therefore constraints
(4) and (9) are non-binding and there are 7 binding constraints to solve for
7 unknowns (Im, Iu, Rm, Ru, Rf (sL), Rf (sH), A). The equilibrium solutions
in this case are:





























The minimum A required by foreign banks is now:
ASNH(r














As can be seen, when h > 0 then AH < ASNH which means that creditors
would demand higher net worth compared to the case when firms must
hedge to be solvent. Also the firm gets a higher payment in the good state,
that is, Rf (sL) > b/[∆p(1− q)], as expected.
c. The firm is solvent in both states even if it is not hedged (1H = 1, 1L = 1 and
h = 0) but in this case the firm still gets the maximum expected payment
during the depreciation state, that is, Rf (sH) = b/∆p and the firm gets
higher payments during the non-depreciation state. Unlike the previous
case, now the net worth required is greater than ASNH . Constraints (4),
(8) and (9) are non-binding so that there are 6 binding constraints to solve
for 6 unknowns (Im, Iu, Rm, Ru, Rf (sL), A). The equilibrium solutions in
this case are:
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The minimum A required by foreign banks is now:
AS(r













As can be seen, ASNH < AS which means that this is an even higher net
worth compared to the case when the firm is solvent but gets zero expected
payment. As expected Rf (sL) > b/[∆p(1− q)]. In all the previous cases, it
is assumed that the monitoring technology is socially valuable.3 As a result
3Monitoring is valuable when C[PG − sLF PB ] < PG[B − b]
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AH < AH , ANH < ANH and AS < AS.
d. The firm is not solvent if it is not hedged (1H = 0, 1L = 1 and h = 0).
Since the firm is not solvent in state H then (3) is ruled out and (8)
is binding so that Rf (sH) = 0. Moreover, (9) is non-binding so that
Rf (sL) > 0. Therefore, there are 7 binding constraints to solve for 7 un-



























The minimum net worth requirement is:
ANH(r








(1− q)[R− b+ C
∆p(1− q)
]
2. The firm borrows only in foreign currency from international banks (1m = 0).
As in the previous case, there are four different cases as well:
a. The firm is solvent in both states if hedged (1H = 1 and 1L = 1). There are
7 constraints to solve for 6 unknowns (h, Iu, Ru, Rf (sL), Rf (sH), A) so that
one constraint is non-binding. As before, constraints (2) and (3) combined
with (8) and (9) define the range for optimal hedging h. For any positive
and small transaction cost φ, the firm chooses the minimum level to avoid
default so that optimal hedging is h = h. This result implies that (8) is
binding and (9) is non-binding. The firm hedges enough to avoid default
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The minimum A required by foreign banks is:
AH(r
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b. The firm is solvent in both states even if it is not hedged: (1H = 1, 1L = 1
and h = 0). Intuitively again, this firm has high enough net worth (i.e.
higher than the minimum A when it has to hedge to be solvent). As in the
case of 1m = 1 now constraints (4) and (9) are non-binding and there are
5 binding constraints to solve for 5 unknowns (Iu, Ru, Rf (sL), Rf (sH), A).
The equilibrium solutions are:
Rf (sL) = (R
sH − sL
sL










The minimum A required by foreign banks is now:
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ASNH(r





Note that when h > 0 then AH < ASNH which means that banks de-
mand higher net worth compared to the case when firms must hedged to
be solvent. Also, the firm gets a higher payment in the good state, that is,
Rf(sL) > B/[∆p(1− q)], as expected.
c. The firm is solvent in both states even if it is not hedged as before (1H =
1, 1L = 1 and h = 0) but in this case the firm still gets the maximum ex-
pected payment during the depreciation state, that is Rf (sH) = B/∆p and
the firm gets higher payments during the non-depreciation state. Unlike the
previous case, now the net worth required is higher than ASNH . Constraints
(4) and (8) and (9) are non-binding and there are 4 binding constraints to
solve for 4 unknowns (Iu, Ru, Rf (sL), A). The equilibrium solutions are:
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The minimum A required by foreign banks is now:
AS(r







As can be seen, ASNH < AS and as expected Rf (sL) > B/[∆p(1− q)].
d. The firm is not solvent if it is not hedged (1H = 0, 1L = 1 and h = 0).
Constraint (2) is ruled out and constraint (8) is binding so that Rf (sH) =
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0. Constraint (9) is non-binding so that Rf (sL) > 0. Therefore, there



















and the minimum net worth requirement is:
ANH(r





3. The firm borrows only in domestic currency from local banks: then Ru = Iu = 0.
It can be shown that the firm is indifferent between hedging and not hedging
if φ = 0. Hence, without loss of generality, it can be concluded that in this
case the firm is always solvent and does not hedge because it does not need
to. Constraints (8) and (9) are non-binding and constraint (7) is not relevant.
Profit maximizing firms pay domestic banks just the least banks demand to
participate so that constraints (5) and (6) are binding and the only possible
non-binding constraint is (4). Therefore, by making constraint (1) bind to solve
for the minimum net worth A, there are 5 binding constraints to solve for 5
unknowns (Im, Rm, Rf (sL), Rf (sH), A). The equilibrium solution is given by:
Rf (sL) = R−
C
∆p
, Rf (sH) = R−
C
∆p












The minimum net worth requirement is:
AB(r






Note that AB > AS > ASNH . Furthermore, for firms to demand only domestic
currency debt the monitoring cost C must be sufficiently high so that local banks
lend relatively high amounts in domestic currency and AB < AH . Otherwise,
small domestic debt would imply that AB > AH , in which case firms would
never borrow only in domestic currency because they have enough net worth to




B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Under credible fixed exchange rates: q = 0. If φ = 0 then the net worth require-
ments for being hedged and being not hedged are equal, that is, AH = ANH < ASNH
and AH = ANH < ASNH . Firms with net worth A such that A ≥ ASNH or A ≥ ASNH
need not hedge. Therefore, the relevant region of net worth requirement for which
a firm could hedge are AH < A < ASNH if the firm borrows from local banks and
AH < A < ASNH if the firm borrows directly in foreign currency. For any net worth
A within these regions profits are given by:
E[ΠTOT ] = PG[R−Rm − sL Ru − φ|h|]
When φ ≥ 0, this expression is strictly lower if the firm is hedged given that q ≤ q
ensures a positive level of hedging when the firm decides to hedge. Therefore, not
hedging is preferred to hedging for firms in the above regions.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
When hedging is costless (φ = 0) a hedging firm faces a lower net worth re-
quirement relative to a firm that decides not to hedge, that is, AH < ANH and
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AH < ANH . Consider a firm with net worth ANH < A < ASNH within the monitor-
ing region having to choose between hedging or not. If the firm decides not to hedge
then Rm =
C
∆p(1−q) and Ru =
r∗Iu
PG(1−q)





















r∗Iu], if not hedged
Notice that a pair of similar expressions can be obtained for firms with ANH <
A < ASNH borrowing directly from foreign banks (the only difference is that Rm = 0
so that C/∆p does not appear in the profit expressions). Costless hedging implies
that E[ΠTOT ]
H > E[ΠTOT ]
NH and hedging is preferred over not hedging, when not
hedging implies insolvency in state H. In cases in which and ANH ≥ ASNH and
ANH ≥ ASNH , net worth requirements ANH and ANH are irrelevant because any
firm with A ≥ ANH or A ≥ ANH is solvent enough and need not hedge.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
This proposition refers to monitored firms with A < AH . There are three different
cases depending on parameters q and φ so that each case will be separately proven.
a. When q ≥ q the optimal decision for a firm within the monitoring region is to
borrow in both currencies and not hedge. The result follows from the definition
of q. Recall that when q ≥ q then ASNH ≤ AH < ANH so that the the
minimum net worth in the monitoring region is ASNH and any firm within the
monitoring region is solvent in state H even without hedging. For any φ > 0
profit maximization implies zero hedging (e.g. any other amount will reduce
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profits). If φ = 0 the firm could choose any value of hedging since hedging
is a fair game and does not affect its profits (e.g. it could choose a negative
amount). Therefore, zero hedging is optimal.
b. When 0 < q < q and φ < (1 − q)(sH − sL) then AH < ANH and h > 0. Two
possible cases arise:
b1 If q is sufficiently high such that ANH > ASNH then ANH becomes irrelevant
because any firm with A > ASNH is solvent without hedging. Therefore, a
firm with net worth A such that AH < A < ASNH must hedge to be able to
borrow in both currencies and 0 < φ < (1−q)(sH−sL) guarantees that the
lower limit in the optimal hedge range h is positive. Hence the minimum
net worth defining the the monitoring region is AH so that optimal hedging
is positive and preferred over not hedging.
b2 If q is sufficiently small such that both cutoff levels ANH and AH are
smaller than ASNH then the hedging decision depends on whether AH <




which makes the firm indifferent between
hedging and not hedging, that is, AH = ANH . For any given 0 < q < q it
is the case that φ∗(q) < (1− q)(sH − sL) such that:
i. When φ < φ∗(q) < (1 − q)(sH − sL) then AH < ANH and hedging
is preferred over not hedging for a firm with net worth A such that
AH < A < ANH . This is similar to case b1.
ii. When φ∗(q) < φ < (1−q)(sH−sL) then ANH < AH . In this case, given
parameters φ and q there exists a net worth A∗ with AH < A
∗ < ASNH
that makes the firm indifferent between hedging and not hedging so
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that:
∗ If AH < A < A∗ then not hedging is preferred over hedging.
∗ If A∗ < A < ASNH then hedging is preferred over not hedging.
As can be seen, not all firms with A > AH prefer to hedge, only those
with A > A∗ will do it. On the other hand, firms with net worth A
such that ANH < A < AH need not hedge. Therefore, only some firms
with net worth A such that ANH < A < ASNH will be hedged.
c. When φ ≥ (1− q)(sH − sL) then optimal hedging must be zero because
for any given level of q then ASNH ≤ AH and the firm is always solvent
without hedging. Depending on q, the minimum net worth defining
the lower limit of the monitoring region could be ANH or ASNH . If
ASNH < A < ANH then the firm borrows in foreign currency and does
not hedge because hedging is not affordable. Now q is large enough
so that the firm borrows a small amount in foreign currency and has
a net worth enough to be solvent in state H even without hedging. If
ANH < A < ASNH then q is small enough so that the firm borrows in
foreign currency and does not hedge because hedging is not affordable
and state H is less likely. In any case, the optimal decision is not to
hedge because hedging is too expensive. 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The results follow directly from the minimum net worth requirements defining
the monitoring region AH and AH (or ANH and ANH if hedging costs are high
but not prohibitive as to make some firms prefer to be unhedged). First, higher q
increases the cutoff net worth defining the lower limit of the monitoring region so
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that poorly capitalized firms lose their funding implying that aggregate investment
drops. Second, higher q also increases the upper limit of the monitoring region so
that some firms borrowing only in foreign currency from international banks during
the fixed exchange rate regime lie within the monitoring region after q increases. As
a result, fewer firms are able to borrow directly from foreign banks and those moving




C.1 Description of Variables
The following variables are defined for each firm and each year.
logsize: natural logarithm of sales revenues.
sales growth: growth rate of revenues from year t− 1 to year t.
margin: ratio of EBIT to total assets.
ebitda: ratio of EBITDA to total assets.
dep/TA: ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets.
ppe/TA: ratio of permanent assets (the bulk of which are plant, property, and
equipment) to total assets.
leverage: ratio of total debt to total assets.
cash: ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets.
invinc: income from equity investments in other firms.
dderiv: dummy variable set to 1 if firm uses foreign currency derivatives, and zero
otherwise.
export: dummy variable set to 1 if firm reports export sales, and zero otherwise.
dol: dummy variable set to 1 if firm reports foreign currency asset holdings, and
zero otherwise.
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C.2 Foreign currency Operations and Firm Value
This section illustrates the construction of variables related to foreign currency
operations using information that Brazilian companies report to BOVESPA. It also
illustrates the construction of the firm value variables used in the analysis.
We use Acesita S.A. during 2001 as an example firm. All figures are expressed in
thousand of R$. From footnotes to the financial statements the following consolidated
information is located under the item “Emprestimos e Financiamentos” (Loans and
Financing) :
“Emprestimos e Financiamentos” 2001
“Moeda estrangeira” (Foreign currency) 2074809
“Moeda nacional” (Domestic currency) 330411
Total 2405220
“Passivo circulante” (Short-term) 986655
“Exigibel a longo prazo” (Long-term) 1418565
Under the item “Debentures”, the company reports the following information:
“Debentures” 2001
“Total 261835
“Passivo circulante” (Short-term) 200492
“Exigibel a longo prazo” (Long-term) 61343
Under the item “Instrumentos Financeiros” (Financial Instruments) the company
reports the following information:
“Instrumentos Financeiros” 2001
“Operacoes de Swap” (currency swap operations) 995404
“Disponibilidades” (foreign currency assets) 269954
In another report called “Relatorio Da Administracao” (Report to the Adminis-
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tration) available at BOVESPA the company provides information about total sales.
During 2001 revenues from foreign sales are R$ 311500.
Economatica also provides the following information about market value for the
company in 2001: equity market value of R$ 492773.35 and book value of equity of
R$ 1147423.
With the previous information, we construct the following variables:
Total debt = short-term debt + debentures + long-term debt + long term bonds
Total debt = 2667055
Dollar debt = Foreign Currency debt
Dollar debt = 2074809
Domestic debt = Total debt - dollar debt
Domestic debt = 592246
Dummy variables:
dderiv =1 (holding of dollar derivatives)
export =1 (exporter)
dol= 1 (holding of dollar assets)
Firm value variables:
market-to-book value of assets:
mtb = (total debt + equity market value)/(total debt + book value of equity)
mtb = 3159828.35 / 3814478 = 0.8284
market-to-book value of equity:
mb = equity market value / book value of equity
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